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"[I]nterpretation" is a chameleon. When a performing musician
"interprets" a work of music, is he expressing the composer's, or
even the composition's, "meaning," or is he not rather expressing
himself within the interstices of the score?
-Richard Posner
1
Today the conductor, more than any one musical figure, shapes
our musical life and thought. That may not be how things should
be, but it is the way they are. In a future, fully automated age, it
may be that the conductor, along with all performing musicians,
will be obsolete. Musical creators are working toward that day,
assembling electronic scores that, once put on tape, never vary....
But until that unfortunate day is here, let us be thankful that there
still remain interpretive musicians to synthesize the product of the
composer. For without the interplay between the minds of the
creator and interpreter, music is not only stale, flat and unprofit-
able. It is meaningless.... Musical notation is an inexact art, no
matter how composers sweat and strive to perfect it. Symbols and
instructions on the printed page are subject to various interpreta-
tions, not to one interpretation.
-Harold Schonberg
2
The legislature is like a composer. It cannot help itself: It must
leave interpretation to others, principally to the courts.
-Jerome Frank3
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I. PROBLEMS FOR THE PERFORMING ARTIST: BEETHOVEN'S
F-NATURAL, SCHUBERT'S REPEATS, AND THE FEDERAL
LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
The eminent pianist and writer Charles Rosen has noted that
"[t]here is an irritating or piquant wrong note in the [score of the]
first movement of Beethoven's first piano concerto, a high F-natural
where the melody obviously calls for an F-sharp." 4 What accounts
for an "obvious" error by this giant of classical music? The answer,
says Rosen, lies in the developmental state of the piano when
Beethoven composed the concerto: the piano keyboard stopped at
F-natural, which therefore established the limit of what was
physically possible for a performer to play. To be sure, Beethoven
might have written "aspirationally" and composed what, though
impossible under current conditions, could nonetheless be aspired
to under some future imagined state. Thus Rosen writes of a piano
sonata in which Beethoven "asks for a successive crescendo and
diminuendo on a single sustained note," even though "the instrument
that can realize this has not yet been invented."5 But at least this
suggests that Beethoven was capable of envisioning the possibility
of radical transformation regarding piano design and wanted to
signify an intention should those possibilities ever be realized.
What, then, does the performer do with the F-natural, where
Beethoven appears instead to have acquiesced to the limits of the
instrument?
Though the piano that can simultaneously heighten and reduce
the sound level of the same note apparently still awaits its develop-
ment, the piano has indeed been transformed beyond the instru-
ment known to Beethoven in Vienna. Indeed, the expansion of the
keyboard happened only shortly after the composition of the first
concerto; high F-sharps soon were available to both composers and
performers, as exemplified by Beethoven's own use of this note in
a number of subsequent compositions, including, interestingly
enough, a cadenza meant to be performed as part of the first
concerto. 6 He did not, however, return to the initial composition
and physically change the notation of the earlier F-natural, in spite
of an announced intention, in Rosen's words, "of revising his early
4 Rosen, The Shock of the Old (Book Review), N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 19, 1990, at
46, 48.
5 Id. at 48.
6 See id.
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works in order to make use of the extended range."7 What, then,
is a performer to do when she comes to the measure in question?
Should she feel bound by the "plain meaning" of the written score,
which displays the F-natural, or ignore it and play what Rosen, a
gifted pianist, calls the "obviously" preferable F-sharp?
What note should be played is only the first question. Just as
important is another. Should we expect the performer, along with
playing whatever note she thinks preferable, to offer a "theory" of
musical performance that explicitly offers ajustification for the note
played? Such a theory, for example, would recognize the presence
of such contending factors as the standard meaning of musical
notation (to those trained in reading music), the composer's
presumed intent, the likely sound heard by the initial audiences of
the piece, the expectations of the modern audience, or purely
aesthetic desirability-i.e. (or is it e.g.?) the production of beautiful
and satisfying sequences of sound. Consider also our reactions if
the performer gave as a response to our question, "Why did you
play that note?" something like, "I just perform and play the note
that feels right to me. If you want a theory of performance, go ask
someone else. I can't imagine why you would expect one from me,
or why you would feel that being given a theory would be of any
use."
8
If we expect the performer to be able to defend her choice to F-
sharp or not to F-sharp, would we (however that "we" is defined)
advise the performer to look not only at traditional musical
materials, but also at what lawyers have done when deciding the
meaning of legal notation? It should already be obvious that a
lawyer (including, paradigmatically, an adjudicator) engaged in the
performance of legal practice-for example, by being asked to
construe a statute or a Constitution-can easily be presented with
what appear to be equally "obvious" mistakes and be confronted by
similar dilemmas of interpretation. Consider, for example, a
provision of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
that requires firms with unpatented mining claims on federal lands
annually to reregister those claims "prior to December 31." 9 What
is the status of a claim filed on December 31?10 What do we
7 id.
8 Cf. Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theoty, 96 YALE LJ. 1773 (1987)
(asserting a lack of a relationship between theory and practice).
9 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 314, 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a)
(1988).
10 See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). This case is discussed byJudge
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expect from the legal performer faced with giving meaning to the
ink on the page, and how, beyond the obvious difference in subject
matter, would those expectations differ from those directed at the
musical performer?
Before answering that question, we ask our readers to consider
one more musical example, this time from the piano sonatas of
Franz Schubert. The great pianist Alfred Brendel has indicated that
he feels no duty to follow the repeat signs that appear at the end of
the first sections (the so-called "expositions") of Schubert's last
piano sonatas.11 It has, apparently, been believed since at least the
late nineteenth century that "these repeats were vestigial manifesta-
tions of an archaic mentality and therefore merely pro forma."
12
One reason offered for skipping the repeats is that most members
of a modern audience have in fact heard, perhaps repeatedly, the
pieces in question (and, of course, they can, by purchasing a record,
repeatedly hear the piece, even if previously unknown to them, in
the future); they therefore do not benefit from the repeats being
played in the same way as did earlier audiences who only rarely
could hear any given piece of music.
A second reason deals with contemporary concert practices.
Most modern audiences expect three sonatas in the course of a
concert, to be played within a two-hour period. Taking all of the
repeats would require violating one of these expectations. People
would either feel "cheated" by being presented with a meager
program or imposed upon by the demand that they remain in the
concert hall for two-and-a-half hours in order to get their full
allotment of three sonatas.
Brendel's advice to skip the repeats has not met with universal
enthusiasm. Neal Zaslaw, a. professor of music at Cornell University,
believes that "there is no evidence that the repeats ... were not
meant at face value," and he goes on to add that "[r]epeats are
repeats, not question marks. They are there because the composers
intended them."13 To be sure, Professor Zaslaw is no fanatic. He
Posner in R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 267-69, in which he criticizes the majority of the
Court for barring claims filed on December 31 because they are not "prior" to that
date.
11 See Brendel, Schubert's Last Sonatas: An Exchange (Book Review), N.Y. REV.
BooKs, Mar. 16,1989, at 42, 42-43; see also Zaslaw, Repeat Performance (Book Review),
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 27, 1989, at 58-59 for a lengthy letter to the editor responding
to Brendel's argument.
12 Zaslaw, supra note 11, at 59.
13 Id.
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"see[s] nothing wrong with omitting them if time is short, the
evening growing late, the performer or the audience seeming
tired." 14 He laconically notes that even the greatest composers,
"who made their livings by composing and performing frequently
and to order, understood and accepted the realities of adapting the
music to the occasion."15 Still, he seems to suggest, one ought at
least both have a good reason for ignoring the repeats and have the
decency to admit that one is rejecting the composer's intentions on
the matter. Again, one wonders, what is a performer to do, with
what rationale, and might a conversation with one's counterparts in
the law be at all helpful?
This essay is a review of Authenticity and Early Music 16 a
collection of essays that exemplify the heated debates now occurring
over what is variously called the Early Music Movement or the
Authentic Performance Movement. The movement itself has diverse
features, including the rediscovery of forgotten music, especially
that of the pre-Baroque period, and the careful reconstruction and
renovation of period instruments. 17 But the more controversial
aspect of the Early Music Movement is the claim of its followers that
music should be played according to the "authentic" performance
practices of the era in which it was composed.18 The phrase "early
music" has thus become somewhat of a misnomer. The study and
application of performance practices of the Renaissance has paved
the way in the past twenty years for authentic performances of the
Baroque period-Vivaldi, Bach, and Handel, and then on to the
music of the classical period-Beethoven, Haydn and Mozart. Nor
have the devotees of authentic performance been content to rest
with the close of the eighteenth century. For example, one of the
most controversial early music conductors of Beethoven, Roger
Norrington, has begun issuing "authentic" renditions of Berlioz,
Mendelssohn, and Schumann symphonies. If Schumann's Spring
Symphony is made authentic, can Brahms be far behind?
As Will Crutchfield explains in his essay, these developments
have created considerable anxiety in "traditional musicians," an
anxiety, Crutchfield argues, that is well justified:
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 AUTHENTICriY AND EARLY MusIc (N. Kenyon ed. 1988).
17 See Kenyon, Authenticity and Early Music: Some Issues and Questions, in
AUTHENTICITY AND EARLY MusIc, supra note 16, at 1.
18 See id. at 4-5.
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They know it will not stop with Beethoven any more than it
stopped with Bach ten years ago. The movement not only hits
them in the pocketbook, but questions the very basis of their art.
It is as though we told a generation of scientists that their Ph.Ds
were based on a now discredited body of theory-say Ptolemaic
astronomy-and now, sorry, the degrees are no good. Worse: it
is as though we had been told that Ptolemy was right after all.19
As Crutchfield suggests, great sums of money-in recording
contracts and record sales-and great professional power and
prestige are at stake in the debates over authentic performance. It
is no accident that Raymond Leppard, one of the foremost
interpreters of Baroque music in an earlier generation, looks
askance at the claims made by disciples of authenticity, some of
whose recordings inevitably compete with his own.20 The mone-
tary interest alone, a cynic might suggest, is enough to attract the
attention of lawyers. Of course, that is not quite the reason we
became interested in these matters. Our interest is in the theory of
interpreting commands. We are legal academics writing primarily,
we presume, for other legal academics, who are either legal
performers in their own right or, with at least some regularity,
critics (in the sense of evaluators) of the legal performances of
others.
There are two obvious questions raised by our writing this
review, even prior to the specific points we will be making below.
The first concerns competence. Are we reviewing the book as
"experts" who can claim some special training in the areas being
discussed by the book's contributors and offer critical assessments
of and contributions to the scholarly literature of musicology? The
answer, in the case of one of us (Levinson), is unequivocally no;
though he listens to music a great deal, his critical acumen is limited
almost entirely to "knowing what he likes." The case for the other
(Balkin) is a bit more complicated, 21 but he would also make no
claims to being a member of the musicological scholarly community
to which one ordinarily looks for "authoritative" pronouncements
about the quality of scholarly work. But so what? Why would one
believe that one must be an "expert" in an area in order to have
19 Crutchfield, Fashion, Conviction, and Peformance Style in an Age of Revivals in
AUTHENTICrrY AND EARLY MusIc, supra note 16, at 19, 20.
20 See Kenyon, supra note 17, at 7-8.
21 Balkin, unlike Levinson, studied composition and orchestration in his youth,
and has published an article on Puccini's opera Turandot. See Balkin, Turandot's
Victoty, 2 YALE J. OF L. & HUM. 299 (1990).
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interesting things to say about a given book? And this question, it
should be noted, is as true for books about law (about which we are
suitably certified experts) as for books about early music. One of
us (Levinson) has written a book explicitly attacking the notion that
conversation about constitutiohal law should be restricted to those
who have been properly credentialed.22 Thus, if we are so bold to
review a book on early music, we should not be afraid to see books
on law reviewed in Early Music, the leading journal in that field. On
the contrary, we would welcome such reviews, at least if musicians
think there are any useful comparisons to be made.
This last point leads to a second, equally obvious, question:
Why should any lawyer care in the slightest about the debates
occurring in the alien field of music (or musicologists about the
debates played out in the legal academy)? Richard Posner, the
author of one of the quotations opening this essay, devoted much
of his book Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation23 to
attacking the premise that legal analysts really have anything to
learn, at least professionally, from the interpretive dilemmas faced
by their colleagues in departments of literature. "[T]here are,"
wrote Posner, "too many differences between works of literature
and enactments of legislatures [or of constitutional conventions] to
permit much fruitful analogizing of legislative to literary interpreta-
tion."24 One of us (Levinson) had written that "[t]here are as
many plausible readings of the United States Constitution as there
are versions of Hamlet."25 Though agreeing that Hamlet and the
Constitution both present many genuine interpretive puzzles,
Posner insists that they are "so different from each other that it is
unlikely that a Hamlet scholar will have anything useful to say about
the Constitution or a constitutional scholar anything useful to say
about Hamlet."26 Posner's allusion to musical performance in the
22 See S. LEvINSON, CONSTrTTONAL FAITH 49-50 (1988) (defending a "protestant"
approach that minimalizes institutional authority and invites all citizens to participate
as ejuals in constitutional dialogue).
R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
24 Id. at 218.
25 Levinson, Law as Literature 60 TEx. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982). Interestingly,
most readers have read this passage as asserting the infinite malleability of the
Constitution rather than, say, the limited number of plausible versions of Hamlet.
This probably says more about the layman's views about plausible artistic interpreta-
tion than it does about Levinson's views of the Constitution. See infra note 64. Here
Posner attacks the utility of discussing Hamlet and the Constitution together rather
than the view that either has a particular set of plausible meanings.
26 R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 263.
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opening quotation notwithstanding, it is unclear whether his
skepticism about insights from literary scholars would dissipate if
they were replaced by insights from musicologists.
We think that Posner is wrong in dismissing the potential
benefits of communication between literary and legal analysts, but
we also think that the question is not truly a theoretical one, as
suggested by Posner's use of the word "unlikely" rather than, say,
"inherently impossible." The ultimate test in regard to the interplay
of law and literature, music, or any other field is the practical aid
given the analyst, the felt sense of illumination provided by thinking
about Beethoven's F-natural or Hamlet while wrestling with the
possible meanings of a statute, regulation, or the Constitution of the
United States.
Posner's dismissal of the potential interaction between legal
analysts and disciplinary outsiders (or vice versa) begs a number of
important questions. One is the assumption that there would have
to be a transdisciplinary theory of interpretation-in-general that
could be applied to all texts in order for different disciplines to
have important things to say to each other. In fact, many modern
students of hermeneutics have rejected the plausibility of a "science"
of "interpretation in general." 27 As a tradition now identified with
Wittgenstein and his successors insists, there are only "practices,"
each constituted by inchoate and unformalizable standards that
establish one's statements or, indeed, pianistic performances, as
"legitimately assertable" 28 by persons within the interpretive
community that constitutes the practice in question.
At the same time, an increasingly common practice in the
contemporary academy is precisely to look outside the narrowest
disciplinary boundaries for potential insight in solving the puzzles
presented by one's own disciplinary materials. To adopt Claude
Levi-Strauss's famous notion, the essence of the post-modernist,
post-structuralist interpreter is to be a bricoleur, who resourcefully
and opportunistically borrows whatever tools might be available to
solve particular problem,; at hand.3° There are obvious similarities
27 Cf R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 8-11 (1979) (arguing
that standards of correct judgment differ among various disciplines and that neither
philosophy nor any other master discipline can impose its own external standards on
them).
28 S. KRIPKE, WITTGENTEIN ON RULEs AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 78 (1982).
29 See S. FIsH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 303-71 (1980).
30 See C. L vI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 16-36 (1966); G. GARVEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL BRICO.GE 15 (1971).
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between bricolage and contemporary pragmatism. The bricoleur is
not a self-conscious theorist. Whatjustifies using any given tool is
its usefulness. There is no theoretically a priori way of deciding
what tools are either "essential" or "absolutely inappropriate." Thus
the pragmatist temperament, which is most likely to reject the
notion of a transcendental science of interpretation, is also the most
likely to look to other disciplines for analogies and comparisons that
might be useful in the pragmatist's own work. Ironically, it is only
after one gives up the dream of a single tool useful on every
occasion that one begins to see the merits of the diverse tools
available for construction, whether of buildings or of theories.
Indeed, Judge Posner, who has recently announced himself a
pragmatist in his book, The Problems of Jurisprudence,3 ' has hardly
practiced what he preached in Law and Literature: A Misunderstood
Relationship;32 and his later writing suggests he may now be
somewhat more latitudinarian. He has, for example, recently
published a devastating review of Robert Bork's originalistjurispru-
dence under the title Bork and Beethoven. 3 3 Posner raises, but does
not consider at any real length, some of the questions elaborated in
the present review. He notes particularly, and valuably, that
conservative intellectuals associated with the magazine Commentary
seem both to embrace Bork's originalism-the view that "original
intent" should control constitutional interpretation-and to be
hostile to what on the surface seems to be a very similar view,
identified with partisans of "authentic" performance-that a musical
performer should try, as much as possible, to recreate the original
sounds of a musical composition.34 He is certainly correct in
noticing that explanation of this apparent inconsistency requires
some analysis of the cultural moment in which both make their
respective appearances. Indeed, it is precisely the insight displayed
by juxtaposing Bork and Beethoven (or, more accurately, Bork and
Commentary's music critic Samuel Lipman) that seems to disconfirm
the rigid disciplinary separations advocated in Law and Literature:
A Misunderstood Relation.
31 R. POSNER, supra note 1.
32 R. POSNER, supra note 23.
33 Posner, Bork and Beethoven (Book Review), 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990)
(reviewing R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF LAw
(1990)).
34 See id.
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Given that we, too, consider ourselves pragmatists, we certainly
have no desire to criticize Posner's argument by positing another
equally aprioristic notion that reading literary theory or musicology
will necessarily be helpful. Nor, certainly, do we wish to argue that
law, literature, and music are identical enterprises operating under
similar rules of practice. They are not. But to concede that law and
music are importantly different does not necessarily imply that they
do not also share enough similarities to make comparison useful
(and, once more, we em]phasize that pragmatic usefulness is the
primary criterion we are employing).
Rudyard Kipling put the matter succinctly: "[W]hat should they
know of England who only England know?"3 5 Presumably one can
paraphrase (though not parody) Kipling by asking "what should they
know of Texas tort law who only Texas tort law know" (the
justification, presumably, for teaching in our classes de facto
comparative tort law rather than concentrating on the law of a
single jurisdiction); "what should they know of tort law who only
tort law know" (the justification, presumably, for asking our
students to compare the notion of warranty as developed in contract
law against developments in the products liability branch of tort
law); or "what should they know of American tort law who only
American tort law know" (the justification, presumably, for offering
to our students courses on other societies' responses to the
problems treated by American tort law). So the question ultimately
becomes, "What should they know of law who only law know"?
Obviously one can know a great deal about England without leaving
its shores, and one can make the same claim about the other
examples. But is Kipling really "refuted" by that recognition?
Would we not, instead, say that few people cannot learn more about
their own society by experiencing another? Is this not why most of
us refer to travel as "broadening"? Surely this term implies more
than simply amassing information about a different society. Rather,
it suggests that a realization of how they do things in Tanzania will
provide insights into how we behave here in the States. This has
certainly been our own experience, and, we are confident, the
experience of most of our readers.
Why does Posner, who is notably catholic in his own intellectual
interests and well aware of the importance of looking outside
35 Kipling, "The English Flag," quoted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 298
(3d ed. 1979).
1991] LAW, MUSIC, AND OTHER PERFORMING ARTS
traditional legal materials for insight into the law, reject the utility
of a lawyer's reading literary theory? The primary reason seems to
lie in Posner's insistence that law and literature are fundamentally
different enterprises, with fundamentally different points. "A poet
tries to create a work of art, a thing of beauty and pleasure."6
This is, for Posner, presumably true of literary writers in general,
even if their genre is the novel or short story rather than the poem.
The legislature (or the constitutional convention), on the other
hand, "is trying to give commands to its subordinates in our
government system."17 The notion of "command" is central to
Posner's theory. "A command," he says, "is designed to set up a
direct channel between the issuer's mind and the recipient's; it is a
communication, to be decoded in accordance with the sender's
intentions."38  Nor is Posner alone in this view. Robin West,
normally no great ally of Posnerian thought, concurs: "legal
interpretation is the attempt to ascertain the meaning behind a
command; literary interpretation is the attempt to ascertain the
meaning behind an artistic expression.
" 39
In their differentiation of law and literature, both Posner and
West take the poem and the novel as the model of artistic expres-
sion. This is a fortunate example for both scholars, since the poem
and the novel seem to have little to do with the phenomenon of
command. Although Shelley might have claimed that poets were
the unacknowledged legislators of mankind,40 that designation is
clearly metaphorical in a way that is not true of the senator or
representative anguishing about a vote or the military commander
ordering troops into action. Posner thus argues that "[l]aw is
coercion rather than persuasion," 41 and he offers the interpreta-
tion of military orders as a good analogue to statutory interpreta-
3 R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 240.3
7 Id.
38.1d.
39 West, Adjudication is not Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-as-
Literature Movement 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 277 (1987).'
40 See M. SHELLEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY (1821), quoted in OXFoRD DICTIONARY
OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 35, at 505. See also Samuel Johnson's quite similar
statement, "[The poet] must write as ... the legislator of mankind, and consider
himself as presiding over the thoughts and manners of future generations; as a being
superior to time and place." S. JOHNSON, RASSELAS (1759), quoted in OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 35, at 282.
41 R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 249. See also R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 296
(1990) ("Agreement on the meaning of legal texts may in many cases depend
ultimately on force-law's ultimate backing.").
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tion in general. 42  For her part, West asserts that "[I]aw is a
product of power," and that legal interpretation is criticism of
power.
43
It is not the purpose -of this review to question Posner's or
West's reliance on law-as-command or law-as-emanation-of-power,
although both of us believe that undue emphasis on this theory
produces an impoverished account of law.44 Indeed, for purposes
of this review, we will gladly accept their view that law does indeed
often command in a way that a poem or a novel does not. We will
also acknowledge that there has been too much insistence that
techniques of poetic interpretation could prove useful to the legal
analyst, and that law-and-literature scholars have overemphasized
the similarities between law and literature and underemphasized the
differences. But note that what is interesting about the examples
that lead off this review-Beethoven's F-natural and Schubert's
repeats-is that they appear to be law-like commands. Consider in
this context the comments of early music apostle Christopher
Hogwood regarding the discovery of new material relevant to a
composer's presumed intentions: "That's the wonderful thing, I
think, about coming across new versions of pieces or new evidence.
Suddenly that gives you this extra energy: 'Ah, a new set of
instructions for embellishment... ah, wonderfull"' 45 If this is not
a command theory of language, we do not know what would be.
Indeed, when one looks at any musical score, one is faced
predominantly not with expression, but command. For what is a
musical score but a series of directions concerning tempo, meter,
pitch, rhythm, attack, and orchestration that are to be carried out
over time by a group of performers? To be sure, the skilled
musician can read a score like the ordinary person can read a novel,
but this is not normally the way either enjoys music. Rather, one
listens to the result of the commands brought to life by the
performers so instructed. We can therefore imagine a continuum
of artistic genres, some of which are more command oriented, like
the musical score, and others which are less so, like the poem and
42 See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 272-73.
43 West, supra note 39, at 277.
4 At the same time, we believe that an account of.law which focuses only on
community-enhancing or permissive aspects is equally impoverished. See, e.g.,
Levinson, Conversing about Justice, 100 YALE L. J. 1855 (1991).
45 Taruskin, The Pastness of the Present and the Presence of the Pas; in AUTHENTICrrY
AND EARLY MusIc, supra note 16, at 150 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Christopher
Hogwood).
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the novel. The differences are, like those in all continua, a matter
of degree. Even a poem may contain instructions (whether explicit
or implicit) on how it is to be read-for example, through punctua-
tion and accent marks. Far closer to the musical score is the play,
which includes both the lines to be spoken by actors and the
relevant stage directions. To be sure, plays can be read silently
without performing them, and studied and appreciated like poems
and novels. But most people would agree that the artistic expres-
sion in a play is not fully realized except through its performance on
the stage. Dramatic genres thus undermine the distinction between
interpretation of artistic expression and interpretation of command,
for a play's artistic interpretation requires interpretation and
observance of commands.
At first glance it might seem odd to speak of the lawyer or the
judge as a "performer" of law. But in fact, the comparison, first
noted by Jerome Frank, is quite apt.4 6 As John Chipman Gray,
one of the precursors of realism, pointed out at the turn of the
century, the texts we call law are not law-in-action but only sources
of law-they require the interpretation and application of lawyers,
judges, and other legal officials to become law in the sense of a
practice of social regulation. 47 Just as the music of the Eroica is
not identical with its score, but needs a performer to realize it, so
too the social practice of law is not fully identical with its written
texts, but needs the activity of those entrusted with its performance
to be realized.48
Another reason often given to doubt the relevance of artistic
interpretation to legal interpretation is the differences in conse-
quences that flow from the interpretive act. Legal interpretation
affects people's lives and fortunes, whereas nothing of consequence
flows from what literary interpreters do. A second, related claim is
that unlike artistic interpretation, adjudication is distinctively an act
of power. 49  Thus, Professor West argues that adjudication,
although in form an interpretive act, is actually an "imperative act"-
"an exercise of power in a way in which truly interpretive acts, such
as literary interpretation, are not."
50
46 See Frank, supra note 3, at 1264.
47 J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 170 (2d ed. 1921).48 See Frank, supra note 3, at 1270-71. For asimilar argument, see D. KORNSTEIN,
THE Music OF THE LAws 108 (1982). The foreword to this book of essays,
interestingly, was written by Robert Bork. Id. at 9-12.
49 West, supra note 39, at 277.
50 Id. at 207.
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As to the first point, it seems clear that more rides on whether
a young lieutenant obeys what she believes to be a mistaken order
of her commander than if Alfred Brendel takes a repeat in a
Schubert sonata. But that is true only because of the particular
examples offered. In fact, much more may turn on certain
directorial decisions in mounting productions of plays or operas
than the adjudicated result of the average fender-bender. As noted
above, the authentic performance movement is controversial not
merely because of its hermeneutic claims, but because it threatens
to throw a large number of traditional performers out of a job. If
Maestro Norrington is correct, the New York Philharmonic would
be best advised to keep its nose out of Schubert, DvoHk and the
Romantics-the backbone of the modern symphony orchestra's
repertory-to say nothing of Beethoven and Mozart. It had best
stick to music it can play authentically-Shostakovich and perhaps
Walter Piston. No doubt this will have a significant impact on its
subscriptions. It will have an even greater effect on recording
contracts, whose royalties often make up a sizeable chunk of a first-
class orchestra's revenues. The authentic performance movement
is controversial because it has thrown down the gauntlet-play
Beethoven with extra woodwinds and an extremely astringent string
tone or do not play him at all.
To be sure, Roger Norrington does not have the same power
that the Supreme Court does. He cannot enjoin the New York
Philharmonic from playing music "incorrectly," and those who
disagree with him can offer competing readings of the music, unlike
lower courts who are presumably bound by Supreme Court
interpretations of federal law.51 But even if Norrington has less
power to enforce conformity with his views than an appellate court,
it is a mistake to view him as having no power at all, especially to
the extent that his devotees gain control and influence over
institutions that shape our musical tastes and preferences.
One need only look at changes in the Penguin Stereo Record
Guide52 -a record collector's bible authored by contributors to
Gramophone Magazine-to see what is at stake in the debates over
authenticity in terms of economic power, status, and artistic
prestige. In the second edition, published in 1975, the authors
speak paternalistically but often approvingly of the very small
51 We are indebted to Richard Posner for this point.
5 2 
E. GREENFIELD, R. LAYTON & I. MARCH, THE PENGUIN STEREO RECORD GUIDE
(2d ed. 1975).
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number of authentic performances of Baroque music then recorded;
in their view, it's quite all right if you like that sort of thing.53 But
traditional performances constitute virtually all recommended
albums of Baroque music. As the Eighties progressed, more and
more authentic performances, first of Baroque, and then of Classical
music appeared. In the 1984 successor volume, The Complete
Penguin Stereo Record and Cassette Guide, 54 the authors express their
approval of many individual "authentic" performances, tempered
with occasional distress at the new fundamentalism that appears to
inform them.55 "Traditional," rather than "authentic," perfor-
mances, however, constitute the lion's share of recommenda-
tions.56 In the work's latest incarnation, The Penguin Guide to
Compact Discs,57 published this past year, the field of Baroque
music has been largely ceded to authentic performers. It is assumed
that most listeners will want such performances, although recom-
mendations are still offered for those who insist on more traditional
5s Discussing Nikolas Harnoncourt's and Gustav Leonhardt's cycle of Bach
cantatas for Telefunken records, which at that time was virtually the only example of
authentic performance committed to record, the authors note that the use of boys
instead of female sopranos "will undoubtedly deter some collectors." Id. at 45.
Although generally supportive of the project, the authors complain of"a certain want
of rhythmic freedom" and too much "expressive caution" in the performances, so that
"the grandeur of Bach's inspiration is at times lost to view." Id. The tendency to
accent all main beats heavily, they note, is "a constant source of irritation throughout
the series." Id. at 47.
5 E. GREENFIELD, R. LAYrON & I. MARCH, THE COMPLETE PENGUIN STEREO AND
CASSETrTE RECORD GUIDE (1984).
55 For example, in the middle of a highly positive review of Herman Bauman's
recording of the Mozart Horn Concertos on a valveless horn, the authors note:
We are not convinced that the playing of 'original instruments' always
demonstrates their full expressive potential and in the case of the french
horn it would seem perverse to use a valveless instrument, when a narrow
bore modern horn ... can sound the same, yet produce uniformity of
timbre and stay in tune throughout its compass.
Id. at 682. Similarly, in the book's introduction, the authors argue:
While it is undoubtedly valuable to have an educated opinion of what the
music sounded like in the composer's own time, sometimes considerations
of scholarship-however dedicated-seem to inhibit the spirit of the music-
making. Advocates of the 'authentic' school often seem to regard any kind
of expressive licence as reactionary ....
Id. at vii.
56 See e.g., id. at 21-24 (offering recommendations for Bach's Brandenburg
Concertos); id. at 65-67 (Bach's St. Matthew Passion); id. at 1165-69 (Vivaldi's Four
Seasons).
5 7 E. GREENFIELD, R. LAYTON & I. MARCH, THE PENGUIN GUIDE TO COMPACT
DISCS (1990) [hereinafter GUIDE TO DIscs].
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versions.58 With millions of classical music discs sold each year on
the recommendations of Gramophone and similar magazines, it is
clear that interpretive debates are hardly exclusively about matters
of expression.
5 9
As for Professor West's second, point-that legal interpretation
is an act of power, while artistic interpretation is not-we think this
borders on the naive. One does not have to be a Nietzschean to
recognize the struggles for power and prestige involved in debates
over artistic interpretation. Indeed, the essays in Authenticity and
Early Music speak of nothing so much as the battle for authority
between early music acolytes and their traditional opponents.
60
Richard Taruskin complains loudly of the "authoritarian" appropria-
tion of the word "authenticity" by early music advocates, 61 while
' See, e.g., id. at 22 (recommending Trevor Pinnock's performance of Bach's
Brandenburg Concertos while suggesting alternatives "[flor those who still cannot quite
attune their ears to the style of string playing favoured by the authentic school").
'9 And, as Nicholas Kenyon reports in his introduction to Authenticity and Early
Music record companies have indeed found that authenticity sells:
[I]t quickly became clear to the record companies that the legend 'Per-
formed on Authentic Instruments' was regarded as some sort of seal of
Good Musical Housekeeping, and the implication of much of their activity
was that the use of such instruments guaranteed or at least went some
considerable way to ensuring 'authentic' performance. Eventually we
reached the absurd situation where the American company releasing the
Academy of Ancient Music's recording of the Pachelbel Canon affixed a
sticker to the disc proclaiming: 'Authentic Edition. The famous Kanon as
Pachelbel heard it.' Those of us who had difficulty knowing what Pachelbel
looked like, never mind what he heard like, had some problems with this.
Kenyon, supra note 17, at 6.
60 See, e.g., Taruskin, supra note 46, at 139 (noting that the classical music scene
"has lately taken on the appearance ofa 'battlefield,'. .. [and] we are fightingit out,
in this book and elsewhere.") (quoting Crutchfield, A Report From the Battlefield N.Y.
Times, July 28, 1985, at 1.).
61 Taruskin, supra note 45, at 138-39 ("One is hardly free to say, 'I prefer
inauthenticity to authenticity,' or, 'I prefer inappropriateness to appropriateness,'-at
least if one is interested in maintaining respectability with the crowd that swears by
the Harvard Dictionary [of Music]."). Interestingly enough, Judge Posner has also
criticized the "authoritarianism" of those who look to "tradition" for privileged insight
into the law. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 448.
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Will Crutchfield begins his essay by noting that the authentic
performance movement "has come to resemble a juggernaut, a
steamroller, a conquering army."
62
Like Professor West, we also may have too easily accepted that
the paradigm of interpretive debate was a solitary scholar lecturing
on Keats' Ode to a Nightingale from a lectern. Yet it has become
increasingly clear that many acts of interpretation are performative
utterances which simultaneously constitute acts of power.63 Rather
than seeing the legal act of interpretation as exceptional in its
complicity with power, we would suggest that it is quite the other
way around. The legal act of interpretation, which clothes power
through an act of cognition, is the normal, paradigmatic act of
interpretation, while an imagined quiet "powerless" lecture on Keats
is the exception.
Moreover, we think that West's and Posner's arguments about
legal power confuse the effects of interpretive difficulties with their
causes. It may well be true that because the meaning of the
Constitution is debatable, people's lives will be affected by what
interpreters do. Thus, significant consequences turn on the
existence of interpretive difficulties. But this fact is not the cause of
interpretive difficulty. The cause is the semiotic nature of the
command-the fact that the Constitution contains commands
encoded in signs requiring interpretation in the light of existing
conditions. It is because both the text of the Constitution and the
score of Beethoven's Pastorale Symphony are commands inscribed
in signs that must be interpreted by performers that difficulties of
interpretation arise. Once again, we do not deny that the conse-
quences of the exercise of interpretive power should be in the mind
of the interpreter as she interprets, and that they might serve as
reasons for interpreting one way rather than another. But the
interpreter's power does not create her interpretive difficulties-
62 Crutchfield, supra note 19, at 19. Crutchfield reports that the opera director
Frank Corsaro has even coined a phrase for the increasingly common experience of
being frustrated in one's artistic attempts by the new musicological fundamentalism:
he calls it being "gesellschafted." Id. at 20.
6 3 See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMEs NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 135-36, 306, 309 (1990).
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rather it is the interpretive difficulties which give rise to her power
over others.
64
64 In discussing the relationship of law to music with colleagues, we have also
witnessed again and again the unquestioned assumption that, unlike legal interpreta-
tion, there are really no standards for judging artistic interpretation, and that, in
contrast to legal interpretation and legal scholarship, there is really no good way to
say that one performance or interpretation is better, richer, or more faithful than
another. We suspect that lawyers and legal scholars who speak in this way have never
attended a piano competition. Indeed, the entire system of education and training
for musicians is premised on the assumption that some performances are better than
others. The same assumption underlies record reviews, critical reviews of concerts,
and a host of other institutions that are devoted largely to sorting, judging, and
evaluating musical performance and musical talent. This is not to say that people do
not disagree heatedly over these matters, or that views about interpretation do not
change historically; we would only point out that the same is true of legal interpreta-
tion and of legal judgments of quality in scholarship or in judicial reasoning.
We think that the exaggerated emphasis on artistic subjectivity by lawyers and
legal scholars forced to confront the analogies between law and music is a projection
of what are thought to be undesirable characteristics of the self onto the Other. By
opposing law to art in this manner, one is able to suppress the emotional and
subjective elements of legal judgment by projecting them onto the opposite, art, while
simultaneously downplaying the possibility of reasonableness and impartiality in
artisticjudgment. See Balkin, The Domestication of Law and Literature 14 LAW & SOc.
INQUIRY 787, 794 (1989); cf. Torres and Brewster,Judges andjuries: Separate Moments
in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQUALITY 171, 181-85 (1986) (Ideological
construction ofjuries as "emotional" allows judges to suppress recognition of their
own biases and unreasonableness.).
As this essay went to press, we came across a fascinating case that yokes legal and
artistic interpretation together, and thus actually requires a legaljudgment about the
plasticity of artistic standards. The Tams-Witmark Music Library, which licenses the
rights to the Cole Porter musical "Anything Goes," has denied director Martin Teitel
the right to stage the musical with. a man in the lead role of Reno Sweeney (created
on Broadway by Ethel Merman). See Shewey, Anything Goes... Well Almos Village
Voice, Apr. 23, 1991, at S2, col. 4. Previous productions on Fire Island and in Dallas
were such a success that Teitel's unusual casting was reported in the trade press, at
which point Tams-Witmark objected. (Teitel has met Tams-Witmark's action with a
sex discrimination suit of his own.) Id. The standard Tams-Witmark licensing
contract states that there will be "no additions, transpositions, or interpolations of any
kind," although the musical is regularly performed in a modified, edited, and
reconstituted fashion without complaint. Id. Thus in practice, at least, the question
may boil down to whether the proposed innovations go too far. Shewey argues that
"[ilt's patently clear that Tams-Witmark's objections stem from homophobia,
especially dismaying considering Porter's own homosexuality." Id. Perhaps Teitel's
alteration is no more a breach of the agreement than setting the musical in the
present rather than in the 1930's. Nevertheless, in interpreting the contract, we
would think it highly irresponsible for a court to find in the director's favor solely on
the grounds that no one can tell whether or not a production is faithful to the
musical's score and book. No matter how this particular case should be decided,
there must be some point at which outraged theatergoers could demand their money
back on the grounds that the play promised to them had not, in fact, been
performed. We thus maintain once again that legal and musical interpretation are
not as different as they first appear; for in musical, as well as in legal interpretation,
not anything goes.
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II. How TO PERFORM MUSIC AUTHENTICALLY-A LA
RECHERCHE DU TEMPS PERDV6 5
To take up Kipling's metaphor again, perhaps the best way to
understand what other countries and cultures contribute to our
understanding of England is to begin the journey itself. One
quickly discovers that examples like Beethoven's F-natural or
Schubert's repeats do not even begin to exhaust the many different
kinds of controversies that may arise over performing the music of
the (relatively distant) past. We begin, then, with the interpretation
of commands in Beethoven's Symphony No. 6 in F, the Pastorale.
Consider the following exegesis, given in a booklet accompanying
the compact disc recording of Beethoven's Sixth Symphony by The
Hanover Band, an English group fully committed to the task of
performing music "in a form which [the composer] would recog-
nise." 66 There is a certain irony in the Hanover Band's aspiration,
given that Beethoven went deaf well before the composition of the
Pastorale Symphony. It becomes a zen-like question (as in "what is
the sound of one hand clapping?") to ask how one would have the
slightest idea what Beethoven might "recognise" as the sound of a
symphony that in fact he never heard or could hear fully, save in his
own mind.
But of course the Hanover Band probably intended to produce
the sonic effects experienced by Beethoven's non-hearing-impaired
contemporaries. Even if one grants the plausibility of the Hanover
Band's ambitions, their achievement is a daunting task, as illustrated
by some of the issues discussed in the booklet. They include, but
are not limited to, such aspects of musical performance as trying to
recreate "the original orchestral sound" (which means in effect
offering "an intimate, chamber music approach"), assigning to notes
65 We allude here not only to the title of Proust's epic example of twentieth
century modernism, but to the implications of the different English translations
offered in its stead. The standard translation is In Remembrance of Things Past.
Vladimir Nabokov, among others, has preferred the more "literal" In Search of Lost
Time. See V. NABoKov, LECTUREs ON LrrERATURE 208 (F. Bowers ed. 1980). The two
tiles have quite different implications. We believe that the debates over "authentic"
musical performance turn on whether one can truly recover the past or whether one
must realize that those times are irredeemably lost, and the concomitant necessity of
recognizing that we live exclusively in our own time, separated and alien from the
past.
66 C. BROWN, THE HANOVER BAND (1988) (pamphlet accompanying compact disc
version of Beethoven's Symphony No. 6 'Pastoral' (Nimbus Records 1988)).
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the pitch assigned to them in the eighteenth century, mimicking "a
late 18th-century feeling for tempo," and presenting "the dramatic
address to rhythmic accent and dynamic colour which eyewitnesses
[earwitnesses?] describe in Beethoven's own performances."
67
Also characteristic of "authentic" performance is the Hanover
Band's emphasis on the use of "original" instruments, which can
mean physical objects either originally produced at the time of
composition and performance or built more recently in conformity
to what is known about the instruments available at the relevant
time. This means, among other things, that horns will have no
valves, that pianos will produce sounds quite different from a
modern Steinway, and that violins will use catgut instead of
contemporary metallic strings.
The sonic effects produced by early music enthusiasts like
Hogwood, Norrington, and the members of the Hanover Band are
clearly different from what many listeners will be used to. For
example, modern string players move their fingers slightly on
sustained notes to produce a warmer tone, an effect called vibra-
to.68 Early music players eschew vibrato, producing a string tone
that has variously been described as sour, astringent, or vinegary.
69
Woodwinds and horns often sound out of tune, despite the best of
intentions and the most skilled players. In the classical piano
concerto, the pianoforte is replaced by the earlier fortepiano, which
despite its name produces sounds that are more often piano than
forte. Hogwood's tempi are usually much faster than even the
fastest traditional performances and display a certain rigidity, while
the Hanover Band apparently believe that authenticity requires
more flexible changes in tempo than those often heard in tradition-
al performances. Above all, authentic performance produces lighter
and more transparent textures in Baroque and Classical music, with
67 id.
68 THE NEW HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MusIc 910 (D. Randel ed. 1986) [hereinaf-
ter THE NEW HARVARD DIcTIONARY].
69 One of the most amusing aspects of the reviews in The Penguin Guide to Compact
Discs is their constant assurances to readers that the strings in their recommended
authentic performances do not sound half as bad as one would expect. See, e.g.,
GUIDE TO Discs, supra note 57, at 299 ("Collectors fearful of the vinegary tone often
produced by period violins will find their ears beguiled by sounds of great beauty.");
id. at 29 ("Kuijken ... shows that authentic performance need not be acidly over-
abrasive."); id. at 23 (describing Pinnock's performances as "not too abrasive"); id. at
35 ("[T]hese accounts [of Bach solo violin music] are as little painful or scratchy as
you are likely to get in the authentic field.").
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a corresponding loss of weight and, some would say, grandeur.
70
The more expressive utterances-for example those in the slow
movements of Mozart symphonies-tend to be downplayed,71 and
the general feeling is one of buoyancy and even lack of seriousness,
or in Richard Taruskin's words, of music that "seems ready virtually
to blow away."
72
Do these innovations bring us closer to authentic performance,
whatever that might mean? Let us begin with the insistence on
using original instruments. Malcolm Bilson, an early music
specialist who has recently recorded a cycle of Mozart's piano
concerti using a fortepiano, has argued not only that Mozart's
sonatas sound significantly different when played on a late-eigh-
teenth century piano, but that a performance played on such a
piano was importantly better, because more authentic, than one
played on a modem Steinway. Charles Rosen disagreed, and he
used Bilson's protest as an example of the ideological nature of the
"authentic" performance movement in early music. 73 Professor
Zaslaw, whom we have earlier seen in a debate over repeats with
Alfred Brendel, tried to mediate between Rosen and Bilson. Zaslaw
argued that the eighteenth-century Stein or Walter pianos used by
Mozart and the twentieth-century Steinway or B6sendorfer pianos
available to Rosen "are extraordinarily sophisticated instruments,
each perfect in its own way. The two types are quite different,
having been consciously designed to satisfy two very different
aesthetics. Each can do things that the other, with all the good will,
musicianship, and brilliant pianistic techniques in the world, cannot
do."
74
Rosen responded, however, that Zaslaw's attempted reconcilia-
tion still subscribed to the "erroneous and anachronistic assumption
that the conception of an eighteenth-century work was identical with
the sound we think the composer expected to hear."75 He particu-
larly took exception to Zaslaw's statement that both the Stein and
70 See e.g., id. at 447 (reviewing Trevor Pinnock's performance of Handel's 12
Cboierti gross4 op. 6).
71 See, e.g., id. at 682-83 (reviewing Hogwood's performances of the late Mozart
symghonies).
Taruskin, The Pastness of the Present and the Presence of the Pas in AUTHENTICITY
AND EARLY MusIc, supra note 16, at 188.
73 See Rosen, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov., 8,1990, at 60 (replying to letter by Malcolm
Bilson).
74 Zaslaw, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb. 14, 1991, at 50 (letter to the editor).
75 Rosen, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 14, 1991, at 50 (responding to Zaslaw's letter in
the same issue).
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Steinways are "each perfect in their own way," responding that
"there are aspects of the music of Stravinsky, Bartok, Boulez, and
Carter that can only be imperfectly realized on a Steinway. I see no
reason to accept a claim of perfection on behalf of the Stein."
76
To the extent that anyone believes that a Stein is "perfect" for the
performance of Mozart, Rosen argued, "that is only and tautologi-
cally because Mozart is to them what he sounds like on a Stein."
77
To believe that the Stein was "really so 'perfect' for Mozart" would
presumably require that one believe as well that "the greater
sustaining and singing power of the new pianos made soon after
Mozart's death would be a falling-off from this absolute state."
7 8
Rosen freely concedes that "the 'improvements' in construction
entailed a loss of certain tonal qualities as well as a gain of others.
Zaslaw's position, however, implies that all the changes be seen as
nothing but a loss and a degeneration from the ideal sound."
79
Zaslaw's assertion that Stein pianos were "'consciously (and
successfully) designed to satisfy' an aesthetic" is dismissed as "a
naive claim that ignores conflicting aesthetic ideals and all manner
of mechanical problems that stand in the way of constructing
pianos."8 0 Rosen thus accuses Zaslaw (and Bilson) of being
committed to a notion that there is one best way of presenting
Mozart, and he writes a sentence that certainly should strike a
familiar chord in anyone familiar with equally acrimonious disputes
in the world of legal interpretation: "Multiple possibilities of
realizing a musical text are a basic tradition of Western music
"81
But deciding on what kinds of instruments to play is only the
beginning. One must also decide on the numbers of instruments,
which can obviously make a significant difference in terms of
volume, tonal balance, and the like. Yet Harold Schonberg notes
that "[o]ften Bach, like most other composers of the time, did not
specify instrumentation, and he would use whatever was at
hand."8 2 What explains this? The answer is that, "[u]ntil Haydn
and Mozart came along-and, indeed, for many years later outside
of the big European cities-the orchestra was altogether a flexible
76 Id.
77 Id. (emphasis in original).78 id.
79 Id.
o Id.81 Id.
82 H. SCHONBERG, supra note 2, at 29.
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affair" in terms of the numbers of particular instruments represent-
ed and, of course, the quality of the particular players.8 3 Thus a
specific "composer's orchestration depended upon the groups
involved," and, indeed, "[o]rchestration would be adapted to fit the
needs of individual players."84 There is no proof that previous
composers expected that later generations would confine themselves
to the same size orchestras they were forced to accept. Roger
Norrington's attempt to achieve an authentically sized orchestra for
his performance of Berlioz's Symphonie Fantastique based on 1830
Paris models is particularly troublesome in this respect; if there is
one thing we know about Berlioz, it was that no orchestra was too
large for his tastes.
85
The Hanover Band is considerably smaller than most contempo-
rary orchestras, with a far greater emphasis on the woodwinds. The
reason, of course, is that this reflects the orchestras found in Vienna
at the end of the eighteenth century. The members of the Band are
directed not by a conductor standing on a podium, as is contempo-
rary practice, but rather "either from the violin or from the
keyboard as is in keeping with the period and according to the
repertoire."86 We are told, no doubt accurately, that "Beethoven
directed many performances from the fortepiano added by
propulsive internal direction given by the first violin."87 What was
good enough for Beethoven should, presumably, be good enough
for Bernstein, at least if one's goal is fidelity to the former. It does
not appear, though, that any early-music enthusiasts adopt the
practice of early conductors who kept time by loudly beating a stick
on the floor so as to be heard by the members of the orchestra.
88
"The matter of pitch," we are told, "is crucial to a faithful
reconstruction."89 Today's "standard pitch" sets the A above
83 Id. at 28.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 113-14 (describing Berlioz's ideal orchestra of 465 instruments and a
360person chorus).
C. BROWN, supra note 66.
87 id.
88 See H. ScHONBERG, supra note 2, at 26, 28.
89 C. BROWN, supra note 66. On pitch, see Fantel, Equipment That Plays in the Key
of Flexibility, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at 26, col. 1. Fantel, who writes about
"sound" for the New York Times, notes that "Beethoven's notion of C differs from
ours," and goes on to observe not only that "[t]oday's performances, adhering to the
modern convention of 'standard pitch,' take no account of this," but also the fact that
compact disk players generally do not allow the listener to adjust the pitch of a
recording. Id. The market has recognized this defect, though, and it is now possible
to buy CD players that "are capable of tuning the music up or down by as much as
1619
1620 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.139:1597
middle C at 440 cycles per second. The Hanover Band, after much
research, adopts "an A sounding at 430 cycles per second." Not
surprisingly, such differences in pitch produce somewhat different
sounds. It is worth mentioning in this context what is perhaps the
reductio ad absurdum of this striving for historically-informed
reproduction of sound. In Christopher Hogwood's recording of
Beethoven's Third Symphony, the Eroica, he purports to recreate
the initial performance of the music by "a very powerful company
(consisting almost entirely of amateurs)." 91 Thus the performance
features, among other things, the "uncomplicated, rhythmical"
approach found in amateur performances even in the present.
92
If the first performance of the Eroica was mediocre, Hogwood seems
to be arguing, well then, that is the price one pays for authenticity.
If the aural picture historically experienced by the work's first
audience is the true test of authenticity, it is difficult to know
whether Hogwood's suggestion is to be dismissed out of hand or
fervently embraced. Indeed, one might go even further in the
reconstruction of the exact sounds produced at the premieres of the
Beethoven symphonies. Instruments used during the late eigh-
teenth century were often out of tune, especially as the performance
progressed, because of the limitations of the stings used at the time,
for example. Presumably, then, it would violate the "rule of
recognition," as adopted by the Hanover Band or by Hogwood, to
play the music consistently in tune, as that is a distinctly "modern"
expectation, based on subsequent developments in the technology
of musical instruments.9" Emphasis on recreating the actual
a whole note." Id. Fantel somewhat naively suggests, however, that the listening
public might "leave the matter of pitch strictly in the hands of the performers." Id.
The members of the Hanover Band would respond, though, that most performers
cannot be trusted, that only they are presenting the authentic Beethoven experience.
90 C. BROWN, supra note 66.
91 Hogwood, Hogwood's Beethoven, THE GRAMOPHONE, Mar. 1986, at 1136, quoted
in Taruskin, supra note 45, at 140.
92 See Taruskin, supra note 45, at 141 (quoting Clive Brown, notes to Oiseau-Lyre
414338).
93 This is by no means a fanciful concern. We normally expect top-flight modern
symphony orchestras to play in tune, but our expectations about what "in tune"
performance consists in depends upon several factors, including the invention of
horns with valves and the universal adoption of the even tempered scale in the
nineteenth century. To preserve acoustically pure intervals in one key necessitates
that some intervals in other keys will deviate from acoustic perfection, and the more
harmonically distant the key, the greater the disadvantage. See THE NEW HARvARD
DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 422, 837-38. Different methods of "tempering" or
slight adjustment of the scale to compensate for this problem were devised and
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conditions of performance, finally, leads one to ask whether
recordings proclaiming such "authenticity" should not include
coughs, wheezing, and other sounds that were undoubtedly heard
in Viennese drawing rooms and concert halls during the playing of
the music. At some point one crosses the line that separates
scrupulousness from absurdity, but unfortunately one's confidence
in the ability to locate that line has been seriously undermined by
Hogwood's and the Hanover Band's pronunciamentos.
Of course, not everyone agrees with the Hanover Band's
approach to correct interpretation. And indeed, the authors of
Authenticity and Early Music are united primarily by their skepticism,
if not outright hostility, to the ideology revealed in the Hanover
Band booklet. For these writers, Proust's title4 should undoubt-
edly be translated to emphasize the "lostness" of the past and,
consequently, the inability, to present a performance today that
could meaningfully replicate earlier performances. All of them
would agree with Robert P. Morgan's observation that "we cannot
re-create the 'aura' of the original (to borrow Walter Benjamin's
useful term), no matter how hard we try."95 Difficulties concern-
ing the maintenance or manufacture of "original" instruments or
the "proper" pitch of C are only the beginning. Thus, writes
Morgan, "[p]erhaps even more critical ... than original perfor-
mance inflections is the deeper context in which the works were
originally experienced-their status as integral components of a
larger cultural environment that has disappeared and is fundamen-
tally irrecoverable."' Morgan offers as "only the most obvious"
example that much "early music was not intended to be performed
in concert."9 7 To take another example, Bach composed his
employed during the 1600s and 1700s. The title of Bach's Well-Tempered Clavier
refers to one such method, no longer used today. See id. at 838. Eventually, the
equal temperament approach gained dominance, but this temperament is not
necessarily the same one originally used when early music was first performed. See
id. at 624, 838. Valveless horns of the type used in Beethoven's era play notes that
do not precisely match an even tempered scale, see id. at 364, 380, and thus
performers must use various devices (such as partially dosing off the bell of the horn
with the right hand) to approximate the correct pitch. See id. at 381. Some out of
tune performance on original instruments is also due to the performer's inability to
control various aspects of the instrument, for example the gradual loosening of the
sounding strings on early stringed instruments or pianos.
94 See supra note 65.
95 Morgan, Tradition, Anxiety, and the Current Musical Scene, in AUTHENTIcITY AND
EARLY MusIc, supra note 16, at 71.
9 Id.
'7 Id. In the classical and Romantic periods, chamber and solo instrumental music
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masses and his religious cantatas to be performed in church as part
of the devotional exercises of committed Lutherans.
98
Perhaps the best way of understanding the problem is by
pondering a recent promotional advertisement offered by an Austin,
Texas public radio station promising a performance of a Bach mass
"just as Bach would have heard it." This advertisement was
presumably directed to people eating dinner in their homes, to
others working at their places of business, and to still others driving
in their cars. The idea that if we wish to recapture the "authentic"
experience of Bach or Beethoven all that is necessary is to pop a
tape of Hogwood into our car stereo as we speed down interstate 35
seems increasingly preposterous the more that one thinks about it.
Moreover, the very idea of recorded music that can be purchased as
a commodity in stores (the St. Matthew Passion-on sale now for only
$3.991)-and can be played over and over again at our whim-is
completely foreign to the phenomenology of musical performance
in Bach's time, and indeed, of all musical culture until well into the
twentieth century.
9
As Morgan writes, "if we take the notion of context at all
seriously, we are left with the painful realization that any concert
performance of this music constitutes a basic perversion of its
original intentions." 1° ° What he terms "[t]he authentic function
of the music," an interesting term for him to adopt, "is lost to us
and cannot be reconstituted. As soon as we place these works in a
museum, we wrench them out of their own frame and utterly
transform their original meaning."10 1 Morgan concludes his essay
by accusing the authenticity movement of "plac[ing] older music in
a museum," which, he goes on to note, is an essentially "modern
invention,"10 2 created precisely at the moment in our culture
when we recognized the ineluctable pastness of the past and thus
felt the necessity to preserve what was no longer part of our living
would usually be performed in the home or at small social gatherings. See Rosen,
supra note 4, 75, at 50; Holland, Heard the One About the Madcap Trill N.Y. Times,
Apr. 7, 1991, at 25, col. 1 (-[A] lot of music we now listen to silently was written for
noisy dinner parties.") (interview with Alfred Brendel).
9 See Taruskin, Facing Up, Finally, to Bach's Dark Vision, N.Y. Times,Jan. 27,1991,
at 25, col. 1.
99 See W. BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONs 217-251 (H. Zohn trans. 1969).
100 Morgan, supra note 95, at 71.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 81.
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experience in an antiseptic environment suitable for distanced
observation.
Morgan draws a contrast between placing early music in the
equivalent of a museum and treating it as part of an ongoing
tradition. Ironically enough, a living tradition involves participants
who feel (and this word is used advisedly) comfortable engaging in
their own interpretations, their own transformations of the materials
that constitute their identity. What allows one, for example, to
consider him or herself a "traditional" Jew is surely not some fantasy
that one is doing exactly what was done 3000 years ago in ancient
Israel, but rather a felt confidence that one is participating as the
latest member of a recognizable way of life whose transhistorical
identity has endured whatever the surface changes. Few traditions
assume stasis as the operative condition of life.
As Will Crutchfield writes, "[o]ne of the unthought-of things the
great composers assumed, wanted, and needed was the conviction
and passion of great performers," 10 3 who would offer their own
emendations of the composer's score. Exemplifying Crutchfield's
point is the distinguished theater and opera director Jonathan
Miller, who writes of his hope "that by the first night a performance
has emerged that has the possibilities of an enormous amount of
spontaneous growth and amplification" generated by the performers
themselves. 10 4 He mentions his delight, upon seeing a particular
performance of Rigoletto that he had directed for the English
National Opera, in discovering a host of "things that I had never
seen before and never asked them to do." Indeed, "Whenever I
have gone back to watch Rigoletto I have been delighted to find that
it is a truly emergent production,"10 5 a collaborative relationship
among composer or playwright (who may, of course, be long dead),
director, actors and singers, and audience.
For most of us, this notion of living tradition is most obvious in
popular music. What makes Thelonious Monk's Round Midnight a
true "classic" of jazz is most certainly not its ability to be endlessly
re-presented in a single canonical note-for-note form, but rather its
ability to serve as the basic setting for creations by other great
musicians. Even if one exempts jazz from the discussion due to its
deliberately improvisatory form, one can find much the same idea
of a living tradition in performances of pop, soul, and rock music.
103 Crutchfield, supra note 19, at 25.
1o4J. MILLER, SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCES 117 (1986).
105 Id. at 118.
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One might also adopt, as Jonathan Miller does in his discussions of
the interpretation of plays, Noam Chomsky's distinction between
the deep and surface structures of grammar. In Miller's words,
"there are an infinite series of sentences, all of whose surface
structures are different but that can nevertheless express the same
deep structure."1 6 It is therefore altogether possible (and legiti-
mate) that "an enormous variety of actual performances" can be
faithful to the underlying deep structure of the particular piece that
is being interpreted.
1 0 7
Nevertheless, (and, we might add, alas), there are popular
musicians who themselves are increasingly indicating disdain for
those who ostensibly "'distort[ popular music] in all kinds of
insidious ways that are losing track of [the composer's] original
authentic sound.'"1 0 8  Morgan is quoting a "bright young star" of
the New York cabaret scene, Michael Feinstein, who has produced
an album which "attempts a re-creation of Gershwin's popular songs
in their original form," using original orchestrations and texts.
10
9
Morgan fumes: "This from, of all things, a cabaret singer-a type
traditionally committed to extremely personal, even blatantly
idiosyncratic stylizations."11 0  Feinstein's album is entitled, as
might be expected, Pure Gershwin. The work of cultural anthropolo-
106 Id.
107 J. MILLER, supra note 104, at 118. Having introduced Chomsky into the
discussion, we hasten to distance ourselves from any commitment to the general
structuralist program that Chomsky is famous for (and that Miller is adopting). Post-
structuralist critiques, after all, have argued forcefully against the notion of unique
and identifiable deep structures that provide the kind of baseline that Miller strongly
endorses to constrain interpretive license. One might respond to Miller's distinction
by wondering whether continuous changes in surface over time might lead to what
everyone would admit were really profound changes in structure. If the evolution of
Rigoletto continued apace for ten years in his absence, Miller might well discover,
upon his return, that the cumulation of so-called "surface alterations" had made his
original artistic conception virtually unrecognizable. Cf. Balkin, Constitutional
Interpretation and the Problem of Histoty (Book Review), 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (1988)
(discussing cumulative effects of commerce clause decisions). Similarly, the history
ofjazz music has demonstrated that the original notion of variations in melody, while
preserving "deep" harmonic structure, eventually led to substituted harmonies in the
be-bop era, the adoption of improvisation on modal scales in lieu of harmonic
structure in the work of Miles Davis' first quintet, and finally to Ornette Coleman's
"freejazz." M. GRIDLEYJAZz STYLES 40,44,51, 120-22, 177-78, 195-201 (1978). For
a general discussion, see J. COLLIER, THE MAKING OF JAZZ: A COMPREHENsIVE
HISTORY (1978).
108 Morgan, supra note 95, at78 (quotingHolden, Cabaret's Bright YoungStar, N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 33, col. 2).109 Id.
110 Id.
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gists may be particularly helpful in understanding what lies behind
the use of the "pure" in such settings."' To label those whose
interpretations differ from one's own "impure" is no small rhetori-
cal feat. Indeed, it is structurally similar to describing one's
opponents as "heretics."112 Such language suggests the smell of
the auto-de-fe rather than a willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy
of competing perspectives. As Morgan observes with regard to
Feinstein's ambitions, "[a]pparently it is no longer Mabel Mercer's
or Bobby Short's Gershwin we want [or will even tolerate as an
acceptable possibility], it is some sort of reincarnation of Gershwin
himself."113 To switch back to "classical" music, it is no longer
Leonard Bernstein's or the New York Philharmonic's Beethoven we
should want, but rather the Hanover Band's reincarnation. Such an
approach, ironically enough, seems not only to embalm a tradition,
but to be unfaithful to what is historically known about "original"
performance practice, which allowed, indeed celebrated, improvisa-
tion.
114
Richard Taruskin is perhaps the most polemical (and entertain-
ing) of the opponents of the authentic performance school, which
he rechristens "authenticistic." 115 His essay, "The Pastness of the
Present and the Presence of the Past," casts scorn upon almost all
of the claims suggested or implied by the proponents of "authentici-
ty" in early music. Thus, as against the comment by one writer that
"an ideal performance is one that perfectly realizes the composer's
intentions,"116 Taruskin responds that "[w]e cannot know inten-
tions, for many reasons-or rather, we cannot know we know
them."117  In Taruskin's view, "'once the piece is finished, the
composer regards it and relates to it either as a performer if he is
one, or else simply as a listener.'"1 18 As for fidelity to text, he
"I See, e.g., M. DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF
POLLUTION AND TABOO (1978) (describing the cultural construction of "impurities"
that must be suppressed).
112 See R. BORK, supra note 33, at 4, 11 forjust such a denunciation of opponents.
113 Morgan, supra note 95, at 78.
114 See Brett, Tex4 Context and the Early Music Editor, in AUTHENTICITY IN EARLY
Music, supra note 16, at 106-07.
ns Taruskin, supra note 45, at 148.
'
16 Id. at 138 n.8 (quoting Grant, On Historical Authenticity in the Peformance of
Old Music in ESSAYS ON MUSIC IN HONOR OF ARCHIBALD THOMPSON DAVISON 341
(1957)).1 17 Id. at 145.
' Id. at 147 (quoting Taruskin, On Letting the Music Speak for Itself: Some
Reflections on Musicology and Peformance, I J. MUSICOLOGY 340 (1982)).
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quotes the composer George Perle's view that "[t]he greatest single
source of bad performance... is literalism. .. 'It's what you expect
nowadays."
119
Taruskin also joins most of his fellow essayists in criticizing the
historical tendentiousness of many of the "authentic performance"
devotees. He argues that many early music performers are simply
imposing their own aesthetic preferences under the guise of
"authentic" performance practices. He gives the example of David
Wulstan's performances of Renaissance choral music, which
attempted to "'obtain as nearly as possible the sound of the great
English Sixteenth Century Choirs. '"1 2 ' After some experimenta-
tion with the traditional men-boy choirs, Wulstan switched from boy
trebles to women, arguing that "'[b]ecause boys' voices now break
early, they tend to find the high vocal parts ... overtaxing: with
proper training, however, girls' voices can produce exactly the right
sound.' 121 This seems a perfectly plausible accommodation until
Taruskin points out that Wulstan (like everyone else alive today) had
never heard the sound of a "great English Sixteenth Century
Choir." 122 Authentic performance, Taruskin argues, is really the
imposition of a post-Stravinskian modernist aesthetic to the music
of the past. It is a creation of our own times, satisfying modern
aesthetic preferences which are nevertheless justified and even
sanctified by claims of historical accuracy.
Interestingly, Taruskin does not condemn per se the practice of
making Mozart and Beethoven sound like Stravinsky; he objects,
rather, to the claim that this modernization of sound is in fact
authentic, and the related claim that this "authentic" practice is the
only permissible way to perform early music. Taruskin at last
reveals himself to be both a pluralist and a pragmatist in matters of
musical performance. The test of an artistic interpretation for him,
presumably, is whether it "works" aesthetically-whether it produces
a pleasing and satisfying -experience to the persons of our own
era.
123
We have purposely forborne from pointing to all of the obvious
affinities between the arguments made (and attacked) by those
interested in the performance of early music and those made by
119 Id.
120 Id. at 144 (quoting Chislett, notes to Seraphim LP 60256 (works of Tallis)).
121 Id. (quoting Chislett, notes to Seraphim LP 60256 (works of Tallis)).
122 Id.
123 See id. at 204-07.
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legal analysts concerned with how one should engage in legal
performance. A statute or a constitution is, indeed, not a poem; it
is designed to structure other people's behavior in certain important
ways. But, then, so is the score of a symphony or the text of a play.
And the word "structure" is purposely elusive, leaving open the
possibility that the particular passions (and, dare we say, political
commitments) of the gifted performer might have as much to do
with the performance possibilities she chooses as some impossible
fidelity to purportedly timeless and acontextual commands
contained in the texts. Authenticity and Early Music should thus be
of interest to anyone interested in problems of legal interpretation.
But that is only one of the reasons for suggesting that a law-and-
music scholarship can complement the already flourishing genre of
law-and-literature. Perhaps more important than recognition of the
affinities of interpretive dilemmas generated by having to work with
texts, as important as that recognition may be, is the insight
provided into more general issues of cultural development.
III. INTERPRETATION AND MODERNIST ANXIETY
It is our thesis that the early-music movement is best understood
as attempting what the English historian Eric Hobsbawm calls the
"invention of tradition."124 Hobsbawm defines "'invented' tradi-
tions" as "responses to novel situations which take the form of
reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by
quasi-obligatory repetition."125 Faced with "the constant change
and innovation of the modern world," one engages in an "attempt
to structure at least some parts of social life within it as unchanging
and invariant."
126
Hobsbawm contrasts this pseudo-traditionalism to participation
in a living and developing tradition, and, interestingly, one example
he gives is the English common law, which he argues is character-
ized by a remarkable combination of "flexibility in substance and
formal adherence to precedent." 127  In Hobsbawm's view, the
common law could never "afford to be invariant, because even in
'traditional' societies life is not so." 128 Variance means change,
124 See Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION 1-14 (E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger eds. 1983).
12 Id. at 2.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
1627
1628 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol.139:1597
which means history and 'the realization of "break[s] in continu-
ity."129 Paradoxically, to the extent that one feels firmly rooted
in a culture, such changes may be easily assimilated and treated, as
we saw earlier, merely as surface manifestations of deeper unchang-
ing continuities that legitimate the enterprise. Thus, it is crucial to
note that Charles Rosen, after arguing that "[m]ultiple possibilities
of realizing a musical text are a basic tradition of Western music,"
immediately follows with the clause, "a tradition which no longer
apparently has any reality"13 0 for "authentic" performance devo-
tees. As "breaks" increasingly become defined as "ruptures"
separating the past and the present, the stage is set for those who,
dismayed by present practice, preach return to the purity of the
past. Such revivalist movements, "common among intellectuals
since the Romantics, can never develop or even preserve a living
past (except conceivably by setting up human natural sanctuaries for
isolated corners of archaic life), but must become 'invented
tradition, '" 13l committed to stasis and condemning as impurity,
heresy, and defilement what a truly living tradition might see simply
as admirable "adaptability."
13 2
Many of the essays in. Authenticity and Early Music are not
centrally concerned with "proper" standards of interpretation at all.
They ask a much deeper question: What explains the development
at this juncture of our culture of a movement organized around the
notion of authenticity in musical performance? This question has
implications reaching far beyond the particularity of music; it
touches on central aspects of the experience of modernity in
Western culture as a whole, including, most certainly, its legal
aspects. Thus the study of music, on the surface so different from
law, enables us to see things in our own discipline that were there
all along but hidden by our very familiarity with it. By studying
what the crisis of modernity has meant in music, we can better
understand its impact on the law. To handle this crucial topic
adequately would require a book of its own. This essay can do
nothing more than sketch some points of comparison and suggest
further questions for investigation.
There are many ways of describing the phenomenon of
modernity and its relation to what has come to be called the
129 Id. at 7.
130 Rosen, supra note 75, at 50.
131 Hobsbawn, supra note 124, at 8.
1s2 Id.
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postmodern condition. We might view modernity as the increasing
recognition, especially since the Enlightenment, of the conflict
between reason and tradition, including revealed religion, as modes
of understanding the world.133 We might understand it as the
increasing victory of secular or worldly conceptions of life over the
religious and transcendent.13 4 We might view it as the increasing
replacement of traditional modes of social organization by the
bureaucratization and rationalization of society, 13 5 or as the eventual
collapse of the concept of reason into a barren instrumentalism.
1 3 6
We emphasize that modernity is a contested theoretical concept,
which might be extended to much of Western culture since the
Renaissance or restricted to the particular cultural issues of the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which is our particular
focus.1 3 7 Moreover, the features often ascribed to modernity are
not always peculiar to the "modernm " age, however it is defined. For
example, the tension between reason and tradition characteristic of
the modern age scarcely begins with the twentieth century, or even
with the Enlightenment. One can find anti-traditionalism in the
rationalism of Descartes and the skepticism of Hobbes, and still
further back in debates in ancient Greek thought. Although we see
the conflict between reason and tradition, and the concomitant
sense of the disintegration and collapse of tradition as an integral
part of what we call "modernity," we do not claim that it is unique
to the modern era. Indeed, it is more likely that history is full of
what might be called "modernist crises" in many different lands and
SS See I. KANT, What is Enlightenment, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS AND WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? 85 (L. Beck trans. 1959); D. HARVEY, THE
CONDITION OF POSTMODERNrrY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL
CHANGE 12 (1989).
134 See T. SEUNG, CULTURAL THEMATICS 246-59 (1976); G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY 442 (1902).
13 See 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 1381-1462 (G.Roth & C. Wiltich eds. 1968); M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 182 (T. Parsons trans. 1958).
136 This theme is probably most associated with the Frankfurt School of critical
theory. SeeJ. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975); M. HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF
REASON (1947); M. HORKHEIMER & T. ADORNO, THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
(1972).
137 Compare, e.g., T. SEUNG, supra note 134 (describing the creation of a modern
"Faustian ethos" which separates the Middle Ages from the Renaissance) with M.
BERMAN, ALL THAT Is SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY 16-17
(1982) (suggesting that the first phase of modernity begins in sixteenth century, but
emphasizing modernity as a creature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
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times. To speak of modernity, thus, is to speak of one particular
cultural moment in Western thought, when the conflict between
reason and tradition not only becomes central, but is commingled
with other elements that are more peculiarly of our age, such as
mass industrialization, and the increasing rationalization and
bureaucratization of society.
In this essay we focus on a single strand of the experience of
modernity-our relation to the past and, in particular, to the cultural
traditions that constitute it. From this perspective, the experience
of modernity is the increasing sense of isolation and estrangement
from the past and from tradition, spurred on by constantly
accelerating changes in culture, economy, and technology.
138
Viewed solely as the collapse of tradition and separation from the
past, "modernity" is surely nothing new. Each generation through-
out history has probably spoken of the "good old days" that are long
past.1 3 9 One can find jeremiads bewailing the loss of past tradi-
tion to change and cosmopolitanism throughout human history, and
to the this extent the present era has more in common with
previous ones than theorists of modernity often admit.140 What
distinguishes our own particular "modern" period is an accelerating
spiral of technology and bureaucracy unlike any other in human
history; as a result, the sense of distance and fragmentation from
the past appears to have become a central, pervasive, and seemingly
permanent element of the experience of culture.
1 4 1
138 See, e.g., L. SCAFF, FLEEING THE IRON CAGE: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND
MODERNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 18 (1989) (describing progenitors of
modernism as sharing a "consciousness of a dynamic and wrenching destabilization
of transmitted cultural traditions"); C. SCHORSKE, FIN-DE-SItCLE VIENNA: PoLmcs AND
CULTURE xix (1980) (describing the modern sense of demise of tradition in "a whirl
of infinite innovation"); M. BERMAN, supra note 137, at 15, 13 (describing the modern
period as "a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and
contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish[,]" which generates in people both "a will to
change-to transform both themselves and their world-and . . . a terror of
disorientation and disintegration, of life falling apart").
139 See Luban, Legal Traditionalism, (forthcoming 43 STAN. L. REV. (1991)).
140 See id.
141 As Marshall Berman argues, nineteenth and twentieth century modernism is
distinguished by a
dynamic new landscape . . . . [of] steam engines, automatic factories,
railroads, vast new industrial zones; of teeming cities that have grown
overnight, often with dreadful consequences; of daily newspapers,
telegraphs, telephones and other mass media, communicating on an ever
wider scale; of increasingly strong national states and multinational
aggregations of capital; of mass social movements fighting these modern-
izations from above with their own modes of modernization from below; of
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Moreover, "modernity," as suggested by Hobsbawm's essay, is
linked to the development of a specifically historical sensibility that
focuses on the cultural segmentation of time rather than its
continuity. An increased attention to the historicist elements of
culture brings with it an understanding of the profound differences
between the perceptions of times past (and irrevocably lost) and
those of our own. It is just such an understanding that leads us to
develop periodizations of time-e.g., "ancient times," the "middle
ages," and the like-that serve not only to divide the calendar but
also to mark significant changes of consciousness that separate the
inhabitants of one culture from those of another. Some may
applaud such changes as have occurred, as is true of those who see
history as a progressive liberation from the cultural blinders
dominating past epochs. Others may instead bewail these changes
and see them instead as symptoms of decline from some presumably
better state of things in the past.142  But perhaps now more
common is the rejection either of applause or of dejection, which
are themselves recognized as the products of specific cultural
moments, in favor of a somewhat more detached acceptance of the
inevitability of change and our inability to place such changes as
occur within any master narrative. Our awareness of the breaks
between the past and our present situation is joined with a
confidence (if that is the right word) that the future will bring equal
ruptures that will lead to our own epoch being understood as
merely one specific cultural moment. As one of the greatest living
historians, David Brion Davis, reminds us, "in the future our own
mixtures of insight and blindness will be interpreted from that then-
present perspective from which one tries to understand the past.
We will then be perceived in ways that we cannot perceive ourselves." 
143
It is precisely this awareness of perceptual gaps, of commitments to
such fundamentally different paradigms of understanding that
characterizes much of modernist sensibility.
an ever-expanding world market embracing all, capable of the most
spectacular growth, capable of appalling waste and devastation, capable of
everything except solidity and stability.
M. BERMAN, supra note 137, at 18-19.
142 See e.g., A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERIcAN MIND 85 (1987) ("Country,
religion, family, ideas of civilization, all the sentimental and historical forces that
stood between cosmic infinity and the individual, providing some notion of a place
within the whole, have been rationalized and have lost their compelling force.").
14 5 D. DAVIs, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823,
at 15 (1975) (emphasis added).
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The literary scholar Paul Fussell, writing about the impact of
World War I on Anglo-American culture, argues that "the most
pervasive contribution of modern war to modernist culture is irony,
widely perceived to be ... the 'normative mentality' of modern
art."144 Just as Roland Barthes is said to have noted that one can
unabashedly say "I will love you forever" only once in one's life, so
does an awareness of historical situatedness cause us to stand at a
suitable distance from our own most deeply held convictions. To
put it mildly, questions about the meaning of authenticity, whether
of one's beliefs or practices, go to the heart of modernist cul-
ture.
145
As Will Crutchfield notes in his essay "Fashion, Conviction, and
Performance Style," the word authenticity has many meanings. It
may refer to fidelity to the composer's intentions, or to the
composer's text. 146 Yet, Crutchfield insists, there is a more
appropriate meaning of authenticity of performance: "This
authenticity is what the standee at the opera means when he says he
has heard 'the real thing,' 'the genuine article.'" 147  When a
performance is authentic in the sense of genuineness, "we feel the
music and musician are one .... The Irish theologian William
Fitzgerald supplied ... the right citation for this: 'That is called
Authentic, which is sufficient unto itself, which commends, sustains,
proves itself, and hath credit and authority from itself.'"
148
The notion of authenticity as genuineness is deeply tied to the
concept of tradition and one's relation to the past. The authentic
performance is immersed in a tradition, so that the tradition springs
from within it unself-consciously; it is the living embodiment of
tradition, of the past. That is why it is sufficient to itself, and needs
authority from no outside source. Hence another meaning of
"authentic" is idiomatic, sincere, and unaffected. Nevertheless, this
conception of authenticity leads to what we might call the "paradox
of authenticity." The more one self-consciously tries to be authentic
to a tradition, the less authentic one's practice becomes; conversely,
true authenticity always emerges where one least expects it, and
indeed, it emerges virtually without any effort on the part of the
actors who are enmeshed in authentic practice.
144 Fussell, Introduction to THE NORTON BOOK OF MODERN WAR 24 (1991).
145 See L. TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICrTY 97-98 (1972).
146 Crutchfield, supra note 19, at 24.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 24-25.
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At the risk of frivolity, we might offer a gustatory example
drawn from our mutual experiences in the Southwestern United
States. We refer, of course, to Tex-Mex cuisine. For those who
have not been introduced to this contribution of the great state of
Texas, Tex-Mex is an adaptation (some purists would say adultera-
tion) of traditional Mexican dishes by both Chicanos and Anglos
living in Texas. Tex-Mex cuisine has by now become quite popular
around the United States. Indeed, from Seattle to New York City
one can see signs advertising "Authentic Tex-Mex Cuisine." As one
might suspect, those of us from Texas have only contempt for such
assertions of authenticity, similar, we suspect, to the response of a
French visitor to being taken to the "Paris Restaurant, featuring
authentic French cuisine." Yet at the same time, there is something
quite bizarre about the notion of authentic Tex-Mex food. This is,
after all, a cuisine whose delicate flavors are produced by prodigious
quantities of canned Ro-Tel tomatoes and great slabs of Kraft
Velveeta. From the standpoint of "authentic" Mexican food, Tex-
Mex is itself an abomination, a veritable monument to inauthen-
ticity.
And yet, at the same time, there is no doubt that Texans can
always spot an authentic Tex-Mex institution. 149  The streets of
East Austin are full of them, and people are quite vocal about their
favorites. Indeed, some people even prefer Tex-Mex to other types
of Mexican food. The inauthentic has become the standard of
authenticity. The alteration of old habits, the addition of new
ingredients, the catch-as-catch-can recombination of elements has
produced a new cuisine in its own right that can be authentically or
inauthentically reproduced. And the moment that we realize that
there can be "authentic" Tex-Mex cuisine-itself the product of a
previous inauthenticity-at that moment the possibility of "inauthen-
tic" Tex-Mex cuisine arises.
It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that many of the
problems of modernity and its relation to tradition are summed up
in the sign that promises us "Authentic Tex-Mex Cuisine." Each
tradition is the result of previous adulteration and abomination.
Each tradition by becoming a tradition nevertheless asserts its own
authenticity. The self-conscious search to regain and recapture that
149 Of course this statement simply raises the issue of authenticity in the form of
another question: Who, after all, counts as a 'Texan?" For example, both Levinson
and Balkin live in Texas but hail originally from North Carolina and Missouri,
respectively.
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authenticity nevertheless produces inauthentic performance. And
the very unself-conscious activity involved in adulteration neverthe-
less produces ever new examples of the authentic, the authentic that
is not yet recognized as such.
We can understand an important aspect of modernity through
the concept of authenticity, by which we mean the idea of an
organic connection to tradition. Modernity might be described as
the experience of feeling self-conscious about one's relationship to
the past and to tradition, isolated and alienated-in a word,
inauthentic. The paradox of authenticity promises us that the
modernist will both invariably fail at regaining this lost authenticity
and invariably succeed in epitomizing an authentic experience-the
authentic experience of separation from the past, which is the
authentic experience of modernity.
150
All of which brings us back to the early music movement. A
question that fascinates several of the authors in Authenticity and
Early Music is why the concept of authenticity has taken center
stage, whether as hero or -villain, in our own lifetimes. The idea of
"authentic" performance practices would have seemed bizarre to
earlier ages. A composer of early music, wrote the music historian
Donald Grout, would be "astonish[ed] at our interest in such
matters. Have we no living tradition of music, that we must be
seeking to revive a dead one?" 151 Will Crutchfield notes:
[I]f you were an Italian singer in 1888, you did not think of
singing Rossini style for Rossini and Mozart style for Mozart and
Verdi style for Verdi. You just sang. The way you sang-how you
felt a crescendo, where you would instinctively accelerate, where
you would feel the need to make an ornament, what a good
pianissimo note sounded like to you-would have been in the style
of the cultural situation of 1888, a style that developed in
symbiosis with the middle and late operas of Verdi, along with the
secondary composers such as Ponchielli who were active at the
150 Because people usually desire what they feel they most lack, often the more
self-conscious a person is, the more avidly she will seek authentic experience. Thus,
it was no accident that the Romantic era was both an era of extreme self-conscious-
ness and an age which stressed the importance of authenticity. See M. BERMAN, THE
PoLrrICs OF AuTrHENTITcrrY: RADICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF
MODERN SOCIETY 312-15 (1970) (emphasizing the importance of Montesquieu and
Rousseau to the development of the romantic concern for authenticity, and showing
the roots of the modem concern for authenticity in romantic self-consciousness).
151 Taruskin, supra note 45, at 141 (quoting Grout, On HistoricalAuthenticity in the
Performance of Old Music in ESSAYS ON MUSIC IN HONOR OF ARCHIBALD THOMPSON
DAVISON 346 (1957)).
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time .... The concept did not yet exist of different style-complexes
that could be stuck into the heads of performers like a floppy disc
into a word processor depending on what program was desired
that evening.
1 52
There are several reasons fox the previous lack of concern with
authentic performance. During the nineteenth century there was
still a continuous outpouring of what we now label "classical" music.
Thus performers focused more on performing the new music of the
1800s, and less upon preserving a repertory of old classics, as is the
case today. One played Mozart and Beethoven as one would play
other music. There was no division of classical versus early
romantic versus late romantic music. There was simply music, and
it was performed according to the best stylistic practices of the
day.153 These stylistic practices colored the music of the past in
terms of the tastes of the present. But this coloration was not
noticed, because the cultural subject saw herself as at one with the
past, not even conscious of following a tradition of performance.
To modern ears, the difference between Mozart and Mahler, or
between Rossini and Puccini, is so great that it is difficult to
comprehend this mindset. Perhaps the best analogy is to 'the
popular music of today-rock and roll. When Bruce Springsteen
plays a cover of "Twist and Shout" during a 1990's rock and roll
concert, he simply plays the music as a rock and roll song. He does
not engage in self-conscious inquiry into early 1960's performance
practices. Nor does the audience find this at all unseemly.
Nevertheless, rock and roll performance has changed greatly since
the 1950s and 60s, due in part to developments in electronic
instrument and recording technology, the increased importance of
152 Crutchfield, supra note 19, at 22-23.
153 In understanding this point, it is important to distinguish compositional from
performance styles. The music of Liszt and Wagner, for example, shocked their
nineteenth century contemporaries because of its harmonic audacity, and was often
seen as a betrayal of sound compositional principles and traditions. But these qualms
about new harmonic practices did not lead nineteenth century critics to think that
earlier music should be performed differently than contemporary music. We
emphasize, however, that the gradual breakdown of the tonal system of harmony by
the beginning of the twentieth century, and the development of a musical avant-garde
divorced from popular tastes, did eventually contribute to the modern experience of
separation between performers and composers of "classical" music, as discussed infra
text accompanying notes 155-57. We simply note here that these effects had not yet
fully been felt in the nineteenth century.
1635
1636 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.139:1597
the large stadium or arena as a venue for concerts, and even the
development of the music video.
154
Interestingly, no one yet thinks it very important to duplicate the
earlier sound exactly. That is because, to paraphrase the song, it's
still rock and roll to us. One can easily predict, however, that future
Michael Feinsteins will make it their mission to present purportedly
pure Buddy Holly or Little Richard songs and to denigrate as
illegitimate and contemptible the versions played by performers like
Springsteen and others whom we now benightedly identify as great
rock-and-rollers in their own right.
There is an important connection between being unself-
consciously within a cultural tradition that is still growing and
developing, and a similar unself-consciousness about authenticity in
performance. It is precisely because we don't think about authentic-
ity very much when it comes to rock music that we can be quite sure
that rock and roll is still a living tradition of popular culture, in a
way that (for example) ragtime is not. As Will Crutchfield puts it:
The great benefit of this close, narrow correspondence between
contemporary composition and performing style-as we can still
observe it in popular music, on historic recordings, in a very few
elder statesmen among today's artists, and in specialists centering
their work in the music of today-is that the performer can be so
confident in the basic grammar and syntax of his stylistic language
that true improvisation, true spontaneity of utterance, becomes
possible within it. If the thriving triangular relationship between
composers, performers, and the public had not broken down,
historically informed performance would be neither likely nor
desirable today.
155
This triangular relationship between new music, audience, and
performer began to deteriorate for what is now called "classical"
music around the turn of the century. Although contemporary
"classical" music continues to be written and performed, it has lost
much of its audience, partly because of its deliberate embrace of
atonality and partly because of its avant-gardist tendencies. A new
generation of performers has sprung up who see their basic task not
as the performance of contemporary music but the preservation of
a classical repertory which extends roughly from the Baroque period
to the beginning of the twentieth century. The classical performer
becomes less and less the advocate of new music and more and
154 Watch, e.g., MTV.
155 Crutchfield, supra note 19, at 23.
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more the curator of museum pieces. But the very notion of the
museum, which suggests preservation of the past, also suggests
separation from it as well. 1" This distancing and alienation of
the performer from the cultural tradition that spawned the music
she regularly performs occurs in stages, and it appears differently
in different subjects. The process is gradual; the performances of
the 1950s seem more distanced than the performances of the 1920s,
even if the former in turn seem terribly old-fashioned by today's
standards.
The recognition of one's separation from a cultural tradition
triggers two characteristic reactions. The first is to cling ever more
tenaciously to the tradition as it is perceived to exist. The fear that
the center will not hold, and that one must therefore reassert its
centrality all the more urgently, creates a feeling of uncertainty and
apprehension. This is the experience of modernist anxiety. The
unease of modernism, where "all that is solid melts into air,"
157
produces the emotional search for resonance, tranquility, solidity,
and stability.
And yet the problem of modernity is precisely the self-con-
sciousness that we have become partly alienated from the past. For
the past, once the process of alienation has begun, can never fully
be recaptured. The further removed in time one is from tradition,
the less one can regain the sense of organic unity with it. Because
one cannot recapture the spirit of what has been lost, one attempts
to recapture the letter-that is, the concrete historical manifestations
of the tradition. The result in classical music is what Crutchfield
calls the "museum model" of authenticity-"the precise reconstruc-
tion of sounds as near as possible to those heard by the compos-
er."158 This attempt is doomed to failure, if its goal is to recap-
ture authenticity in the sense of organic connection to tradition.
The mere imitation of a tradition does not really bring the tradition
back to life. A crucial difference separates improvisation within the
tradition and careful imitation of previous examples. The improvi-
sor extends and alters the tradition by unself-consciously living
156 For an illuminating discussion of the problem, see Donath, The Gene Autty
Western Heritage Museum: The Problem of an Authentic Western Mystique, 43 AM. Q. 82
(Mar. 1991) (criticizing the Autry museum for displacing historical meaning in favor
of an unreflective worship of the western mystique).
157 M. BERMAN, supra note 137, at 15. The original phrase, of course, comes from
Marx. See K. MARK & F. ENGELS, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE MARX-
ENGELS READER 338 (1972).
158 Crutchfield, supra note 19, at 25.
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within it, while alteration is precisely what the imitator fears most.
It is precisely this fear of alteration, Crutchfield argues, that the
Early Music Movement must overcome if it is to avoid becoming a
sterile and lifeless project:
If we resurrect historical information on performing style simply
to settle on 'correct' ways of playing, to promulgate and refine
rules, to settle questions.., if we seek nothing more than to write
dozens more programs for the floppy discs we insert in students'
brains-then it would be better if we had never started. If instead
we seek an immersion in the disciplines of the past ... because we
aspire to the freedom and the power that can be gained through
purposeful accomplishment-then historically informed perfor-
mance may enable some of our performers to create anew for
themselves the life-giving musical culture that swarmed around
musicians in healthier times without their having to think about
it.... The crucial challenge is to keep that aliveness in mind as
the goal; though it can be approached only indirectly, it is more
important than the correctness.
1 5 9
The deliberate search for authenticity thus inevitably fails but,
paradoxically, also inevitably succeeds. The experience of this
search to regain authenticity is itself authentic to our time-it is the
authentic experience of modernity. Thus, as Richard Taruskin
suggests, the "authentic" performance movement is really the
imposition of the aesthetic of modernism on the music of the
past.16° Despite the claims of its advocates, "authentic" perfor-
mance of music does not present music as it really was, whatever
that mysterious phrase might mean. Rather, "authentic" perfor-
mance presents music how we really like it (or at least how contem-
porary musicians like it)-dressed in modernist garb to suit the
tastes of our era, not Bach's or Mozart's.1 61 The advocate of
authenticity is quite right that her goal is to make Mozart sound
fresh and new to our ears. But this goal has not been achieved by
producing what Mozart really sounded like. Rather, it has been
achieved by making him sound modern-with lighter textures, faster
tempi, and austere and astringent string tone.1 62 We have adapt-
ed Mozart to our age just as the romantics adapted him to theirs,
only we have done it under the banner of "authenticity." However,
159 Id. at 25-26.
160 See Taruskin, supra note 45, at 152, 155, 167-69.
161 See id. at 197-98, 203-04.
162 See id. at 187-88, 190-91 (tracing stylistic changes in performances of Bach's
Fifth Brandenburg Concerto).
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the felt need to make performance "authentic," even when the
result is really quite modern, is wholly authentic to the modern era.
The second characteristic reaction produced by modernity is the
recognition that the past cannot be regained. It is to embrace, or
at least to accept, the alienation of the spirit from its historical
moorings. It is to comprehend our relation to the past as artificial
and instrumental-to see the past as separate from us, but neverthe-
less something we can use for our own purposes. This reaction to
modernity leads to the eclectic use of the past, to the juxtaposition
of different elements of different traditions, in short, to pastiche.
It is the type of modernist response that eventually leads towards
what is now called post-modernism. When tradition becomes
instrumental, we embrace it with a wink and a nod. Everyone,
including the interpreter, knows that the performance is, in some
sense, inauthentic, and that the interpreter is playing a role. But
this does not raise concern, as long as it serves the purposes
(aesthetic or otherwise) of the interpreter. By forsaking modernist
anxiety, the interpreter moves closer and closer towards post-
modern irony.
163
The post-modern response to the crisis of modernity in art
creates a artistic discourse that closes in upon itself and becomes
increasingly self-referential. Postmodernism shares this feature with
some earlier forms of artistic modernism. The subject of culture
increasingly becomes culture itself. This tendency meshes with the
postmodernist practice of pastiche, as previous cultural artifacts are
juxtaposed and referred to in order to call up their various cultural
associations in the mind. It meshes as well with the postmodernist
attitude of irony and detachment-the previous work of art is
referred to not to reassert what it means or conveys, but to
comment on it or even undermine it. A good example of post-
modern pastiche, irony, and self-reference is the recent film, The
Freshman,16 in which the actor Marlon Brando deliberately paro-
dies his earlier role as the mafia chieftain Don Corleone in The
16' Because of the similarities between postmodernism and modernism, there is
considerable debate among philosophers and historians of culture over whether
postmodernism is truly a different and separate stage of culture, or is instead merely
a later stage of modernism. See D. HARVEY, supra note 133, at 113-18. This should
hardly be surprising, as both concepts are heavily contested in theoretical discussion.
In this essay, we view postmodernism as furthering some but not other features
present in modernism-for example, modernist irony as opposed to modernist
anxiety.
164 The Freshman (Tristar Pictures 1990).
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Godfather.165 The creators of the film make the young hero a film
student who attends classes on cinematic history and technique, so
that lectures about and scenes from The Godfather can be liberally
interspersed throughout the movie. The hero is taken under the
wing of Marion Brando's character, who reminds the student eerily
of the Godfather in the film he is studying in class. In turn, Brando
does not play a mafia don; rather, he plays Marlon Brando playing
a mafia don. Brando's performance is a continual reminder to the
audience that he is playing a role, that he knows he is playing a role
and that he knows that the audience knows he knows he is playing
a role, and so on indefinitely.
166
Robert Morgan's essay identifies these two reactions to the
modernist predicament-anxiety and detachment-with the different
compositional approaches of Arnold Schoenberg and Igor Stravin-
sky. 167  Schoenberg, the founder of atonal composition, repre-
sents the earlier stage of modernist anxiety. Already fully self-
conscious of the tradition of western classical music from Bach and
Beethoven to the present day, Schoenberg feels the weight of
165 The Godfather (Paramount Studios 1972).
166 It is worth mentioning in this context the movie's remarkable final scene,
which involves Bert Parks serenading a group of very rich gourmets who have
gathered to feast on the meat of freshly killed endangered species. As the latest
victim-to-be is paraded before them, Parks proudly sings "[tihere she goes, your
komodo dragon." A few moments later, he is offering a spirited rendition of Bob
Dylan's "I Ain't Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No More." Parks' presence in the
movie is left completely unexplained. What is the meaning ofjuxtaposing Parks-a
longtime symbol of the Miss America Pageant (itself a symbol of American values of
an earlier era)-with the selfish excesses and insatiable appetites of 1980's materialism
represented by the slaying of the hapless reptile? Is the reference to the soon-to-be
devoured dragon a sly accusation that the Miss America Pageant is nothing more than
a ritualized "meat market"? What is meant by the juxtaposition of Parks with the
music of Bob Dylan, a symbol of the rebellious 1960s, which began to put the values
characterized by the Miss America Pageant into question? Is Parks' refusal "to work
on Maggie's farm" a reference to his firing by ungrateful pageant directors who (it is
rumored) felt that because he had so visibly aged, he no longer presented the right
image? Is Parks, like Brando, a knowing participant in the ironies of the movie, or
is he, as his performance suggests, blissfully unaware of the subtexts and subsubtexts
of his performance? Finally, are the creators of the movie really making a statement
through this pastiche of cultural icons, or are they simply having fun and perhaps
even laughing at us for noticing the inexhaustible possibilities of cross reference?
The mind boggles-and of course, that is precisely the way the postmodern artist
would have it. To take the movie seriously is not to take what it says seriously. To
be engaged with it is simultaneously to become detached from the cultural symbols
that it invokes.
167 See Morgan, supra note 95, at 60.
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tradition heavily on his back.1 68 He routinely describes his artistic
goals in terms of progress-of moving forward with the project of
the western musical tradition. Schoenberg sees himself as one who
must carry on the traditions that burden him in the best way he
knows how. 169 He thus views atonal composition as an inevitable
development of western musical practices:
Schoenberg ... holds the traditional view, but in a form whose
very extremity shows that it is reaching a critical, and perhaps even
terminal stage. He understood his own development as a logical
and necessary continuation of the dominant compositional
tendencies that had (in his view) consistently shaped the main-
stream of serious western music. This explains Schoenberg's
discomfort at being considered a revolutionary-a composer in
some way fundamentally separated from the past. In his own eyes,
the course he followed offered the only possible realization of the
musical implications inherent in the work of his greatest predeces-
sors. Schoenberg believed his music to be progressive, certainly,
but not in its basic aesthetic (or even technical) assumptions,
fundamentally different from the music of the past.
170
In contrast, Stravinsky shows much more of the ironic detach-
ment of a later stage of modernism. Although he is not himself a
postmodernist, he displays several modernist attitudes that in the
hands of later artists will eventually blossom into what we now call
the postmodern temperament. He picks and chooses different
stylistic features from different eras, melding them in compositions
by the force of his personality.17' Unlike Schoenberg, Stravinsky
sees himself as fully separated from the past, studying it not to
continue it but to borrow from it piecemeal for his own purposes.
The result is a compositional eclecticism characteristic of Stravin-
sky's style. As Morgan argues, Stravinsky's modernism presaged the
compositional attitudes of the present day, in which "[c]omposers
adopt and discard musical styles at will, not only from work to work
but within single compositions." 172 In their search for musical
styles to adopt for their own purposes, contemporary composers are
considerably more eclectic even than Stravinsky, for "[t]hey do not
limit themselves to the repertory of western concert music, but
extend their grasp to music of other cultures, popular music, folk
168 See id. at 60-61.
169 See id. at 61-62.
170 Id. at 60-61 (footnotes omitted).
171 See id. at 65-66.
172 Id. at 66.
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music, jazz, etc., moving freely back and forth across cultural
boundaries as well as temporal ones."
173
Yet this eclecticism of the modern composer itself betrays a fact
about the culture of the present-the felt absence of a cultural
center, of a tradition of one's own. There is, Morgan says, "no well-
defined sense of the musical present."174 The loss of a cultural
center, he argues, is simply the flip side of the Stravinskian attitude
towards history. "Only when the current moment loses an essential
character and personality of its own, and thus loses its ability to cast
its own peculiar coloration on the past, is one able to look upon the
past with such detachment and objectivity." 175 According to
Morgan, one who recognizes, even embraces, such a notion of our
situation, must also recognize that "the concept of culture, at least
as previously understood, becomes extremely shaky." 176 More
important, perhaps, is the recognition that "[o]ur sense of the
musical present, and thereby of our own musical selves, is fatally
threatened, dissolving into a patchwork of disconnected fragments
snatched from here, there, and everywhere." 17 7 Few have better
described the postmodernist sensibility.
It is interesting in this light to compare Stravinsky's composi-
tional practices with his attitudes about musical performance.
Stravinsky demanded strict adherence to the musical text.
178
Indeed, he pronounced that "[t]o interpret a piece [of music] is to
realize its portrait, and what I demand is the realization of the piece
itself and not of its portrait."179 Elsewhere he invidiously con-
trasted, against loathsome "interpretation," what he termed
objective "execution"-"the strict putting into effect of an explicit
will that contains nothing beyond what it specifically com-
mands."1 80 As Taruskin argues, the essence of performance for
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 67.
176 Id.
177 id.
178 See Taruskin, supra note 45, at 181.
179 I. STRAVINSKY, PROGRAM, STRAVINSKY FESTIVAL, LONDON SYMPHONY
ORCHESTRA 41 (1979), quoted in Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adulteiy Clause of the
Ten Commandments, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 719, 724 (1985).
180 1 STRAVINSKY, THE POETICS OF MUSIC 163 (A. Knodel and I. Dahi trans. 1956).
Of course Stravinsky's demand for objectivity does not avoid interpretive difficulties,
even of his own works. In the 1920's, desperate for money, Stravinsky arranged his
orchestral compositions for player piano. On these pianola rolls, the dance at the
end of his famous ballet Rite of Spring "is much faster than on any recordings,
including his own 'final' versions of 1960 and 1961." A Dance to the Death, THE
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Stravinsky was "scrupulous fidelity to the letter of the text, and an
ascetic avoidance of unspecified nuance in the name of expres-
sion.""'1 As we should already have come to expect, Stravinsky
denounced those whose interpretations differed from his own not
only as mistaken, but also, far more significantly, as perpetrators of
"criminal assaults" and "betrayals."18 2 In fact, Stravinsky's eclecti-
cism and his demands for "objectivity" in performance are two sides
of the same coin. It is precisely because one has become so
detached from the past and thus from a living tradition encompass-
ing earlier music that one must make reference to "objective"
indicia-for example, the written text, the actual size of the musical
forces at the first performance, and so on.
Indeed, not only are detachment and objectivity two sides of the
same modernist coin, but, more surprisingly, so are the desires for
authenticity and novelty.183 Morgan points to the deep connec-
tion between the search for novelty in musical culture-whether it
be new techniques of composition or the desire to make Bach and
Mozart sound fresh and new to our ears-and the search for
performance practices of the past. Both searches are a means of
expressing dissatisfaction with the present.18 4 One can escape the
present either by catapulting to the future, or by attempting to
recapture the past and make it one's own. The modernist always
runs, even if she cannot hide.
If modernity has so thoroughly dominated musical culture in
this century, it would be surprising if we did not see similar effects
in legal culture as well. Obvious examples abound, the most
obvious, ironically, being the insistence on the unique legitimacy of
original intention as a guide to constitutional meaning.
185 With
ECONOMIsT, Apr. 6, 1991, at 89. Ben Zander, the conductor of the semi-amateur
Boston Philharmonic, has studied the piano rolls and concluded that they reflect
Stravinsky's original intentions, but that Stravinsky compromised later because the
first orchestras that tackled the piece simply could not perform his complex music at
the speed he desired. Id. Is a conductor who performs the Rite at the faster speed
engaging in objective "execution" or loathsome "interpretation"? Did Stravinsky, who
performed and recorded the Rite of Spring in more than one way, engage in
fraudulent "interpretations" of his own music?
181 Taruskin, supra note 45, at 181.
182 Id.
183 See Morgan, supra note 95, at 75.
184 Id. at 75-76.
185 See R. BORK, supra note 33, at 6-8. We are grateful to Robert Post for pointing
out that Thomas Hobbes (whose pessimism, skepticism about values, and statism have
much in common withJudge Bork's philosophy) also developed a highly originalist
theory of interpretation. See D. HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT
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modernity comes historicism-the understanding that the past has
become alien to us and the desire to recapture what is slipping
away. With detachment comes anxiety, and, as Hobsbawm suggests,
the desperate attempt to deny the meaningfulness of history even
as one denounces one's contemporaries for having deviated so far
from purported models of the past.1 6 Those who disagree are,
as Stravinsky asserted, not merely mistaken, but criminal assailants
on the uniquely legitimate way of performing constitutional analysis.
Our thesis is that we will find evidence of modernist anxiety and
detachment, with a concomitant quest to regain "objective" indicia
of performance and the invention of sacralized "traditions," in many
different areas of culture, including, most certainly, both the
general legal culture and its bastion of self-consciousness, the legal
academy. By focusing on Robert Bork's jurisprudence of original
intention as a quintessentially modernist response, we suggest an
important difference between our perspective and that presented by
David Luban in his interesting and important article, Legal Modern-
ism. 187 Luban argues that the Critical Legal Studies movement
represents the best analogy of modernist art to law.1 88 The work
of CLS scholars, in Luban's view, shares with modernist art a
penchant for provocation, a feeling of homelessness in the world,
and a tendency towards self-consciousness and self-commentary
about its own production.189 Although Luban takes as his model
of inquiry modern art rather than musical performance, and
although he assigns to the modern what some might now call
postmodern, his discussion of the characteristic features of
modernity is largely consistent with our own. For example, Luban's
emphasis on "homelessness" as a recurring motif in modernist
art1' 9 describes from another perspective the sense of separation
THEORY 145 (1989). Thus the turn to "originalism" is not unique to our current
(twentieth century) brand of modernism; it also shows how twentieth century
modernism has many antecedents. Moreover, Post's example is an excellent
demonstration of how heavily contextual judgments of modernism are. Hobbes is
certainly not "modern" in contrast to twentieth century thinkers, but in another sense
he is a veritable architect of modernism in his demolition of Aristotelian traditional-
ism. Cf. Balkin, Nested Oppositions (Book Review), 99 YALE LJ. 1669, 1678-82 (1990)
(depending on context, cultural concepts are always both exemplified by and in
opposition to their concrete historical manifestations).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 125-32.
187 See Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656 (1986).
188 See id. at 1656-59.
189 See id. at 1657-59.
'90 See id. at 1660.
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from tradition and from the past we have seen as characteristic of
modernity.
There is much insight in Professor Luban's article. Neverthe-
less, we disagree with its thesis that legal modernism manifests itself
most clearly in the work of CLS scholars or others on the left side
of the political spectrum. It is worth noting that, as a historical
matter, many leading cultural modernists were scarcely left-wing.
As Daniel Bell has written, "[i]n discussing modernism, the
categories of 'left' and 'right' make little sense. ... Nietzsche,
Yeats, Pound, and Wyndham Lewis were politically to the
right."191 Although Picasso's radical political sympathies were
well known,192 so were Ezra Pound's proclivities towards fas-
cism. 193 Lionel Trilling has noted the irony of contemporary
liberal intellectuals' embrace of modernists as heroes, noting that
Proust, James Joyce and Andre Gide were "indifferent to, or even
hostile to, the tradition of democratic liberalism as we know it," and
"do not seem to confirm us in the social and political ideals which
we [liberals] hold."194
Yet modern culture-and the response to modernity-comprises
far more than those who are selectively identified as "modernists."
A culture embraces all who live within it. Jerry Falwell is just as
much a part of the contemporary American culture produced by the
experience of modernity as is Cher, even though each is almost
totally uncomprehending of the other (and even though each is in
some way a reaction to the other). Modernity is an experience felt
by all persons in a culture, even if in different degrees, and even if
the reactions to it may be different in different quarters. Two
billiard balls may move in opposite directions because of the same
cause, a third billiard ball which has struck each object differently.
Thus, to adopt Robert Morgan's example, Schoenberg's self-
conscious attempt to follow tradition is just as modernist in its own
1I D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 51 (1976).
192 See A. HUFFINGTON, PICASSO: CREATOR AND DESTROYER 282-311 (1988).
193 On Pound, seeJ. DIGGINS, MUSSOLINI AND FASCISM: THE VIEW FROM AMERICA
246-47, 437-39 (1972). Even Wallace Stevens, the newly found darling of contempo-
rary legal pragmatists, was not immune from the allure of facism. See id. at 245
(describing Stevens' support of Mussolini and his belief that fascism would merely be
M'a transitional phase' of a state which hopefully would, like [Stevens'] poetry, wrest
order from chaos and thereby lessen the 'disillusionment' and 'misery' in the modern
world" (quoting W. STEVENS, LETTERS OF WALLACE STEVENS 289-90, 295 (H. Stevens
ed. 1966))).
194 L. TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION: ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND SOCIETY
286 (1954).
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way as Stravinsky's embrace of eclecticism. And Stravinsky's
detachment led to both his instrumental use of the past for novelty's
sake and his moralistic pursuit of the past via "objective" indicia of
performance. In legal terms, modernity has brought us both
Critical Legal Studies and Robert Bork.
195
Luban's account of legal modernism, we think, overemphasizes
the avant-gardist response to modernity at the expense of those
trying to come to terms with tradition and the past either through
an anxiously self-conscious adherence to tradition (Schoenberg) or
through objectifying the past in concrete terms (Stravinsky). And
here the modernist tendencies of the early music movement can
provide a useful corrective. The fear that the past is slipping away
and the redoubled search to regain tradition is not a retreat from
modernism-it is one manifestation of the modernist experience,
one version of modernist anxiety. The difference between the
modernist and the premodernist is precisely that the modernist feels
that there is something that has been lost. The conserving (but not
necessarily conservative) response to modernism that is represented
by Schoenberg is precisely the desire to cling to a receding tradition
in order to relieve this sense of anxiety. While the modernist
complains of anxiety, the premodernist asks "what anxiety?" 
For this reason, an inquiry into legal modernity must consider
both the Schoenbergian as well as the Stravinskian attitudes towards
tradition and the past.197 It follows that we are likely to see the
effects of legal modernity not only in the structural equivalent of
the avant-garde in law, but in more mainstream reactions as well.
If there are undoubted modernist themes in the work of CLS
scholars, they are no less present in the work of the political right
or the political center. Throughout the political spectrum one will
find analogies both to Stravinsky's dual detachment and objectivity
and Schoenbergian anxiety. No single view is uniquely "modernist";
all join in trying to make sense of our particular cultural moment,
which features an ever-growing sense of disorder and fragmenta-
tion.
198
195 See Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1195,
1216, 1228 (1989).
196 And, we should add, the postmodernist also asks, "what anxiety?"
197 This is not, of course, to say that Schoenberg and Stravinsky represent the only
two possibilities. We agree with Iorgan, however, that these two examples throw
considerable light on the experience of modernity in music, as well as in culture
generally.
198 For a discussion emphasizing the presence of fragmentation in American law
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IV. LEGAL MODERNISM AND THE PURSUIT OF "AUTHENTICITY"
What we have called legal modernity, like so much else in
American law, can already be seen in the thought of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and in particular in his most iconoclastic work, The Path of
the Law,19 an essay which, almost 100 years after its presentation,
still contains the power to startle.2°0 Although The Path of the Law
has many themes, one of its most striking is its author's attitude
towards history and tradition. "[I]f we want to know why a rule of
law has taken its particular shape, and more or less if we want to
know why it exists at all," argues Holmes, "we go to tradition."
20 1
But one does not study history and historical doctrine for the
purpose of veneration. Quite the opposite, for the understanding
that a rule is historical "is the first step toward an enlightened
scepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth
of those rules." 20 2 In a truly remarkable metaphor, Holmes tells
us that "[w]hen you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain
and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws and see just
what is his strength."203 Perhaps reflecting the origins of Holmes's
own modernist thought in the maelstrom of the Civil War,204 he
makes clear that examining the "dragon" of historically-rooted rules
"is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him
and jurisprudence, see R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 203, 296. For a postmodern
explanation of legal fragmentation and a delightful romp through the categories of
modernism and postmodernism, see Schlag, supm note 195. While Schlag emphasizes
the epistemological aspects of modernity and postmodernity, we emphasize their
broader cultural manifestations.
199 O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).
2N One is tempted to say that legal modernity begins with Holmes, but in fact the
history of legal modernity is considerably more complicated. Moreover, Holmes's
thought did not arise out of a vacuum. One of us (Levinson) has devoted consider-
able effort to showing the influence of a much earlier stream of thought-
Emersonianism-on Holmes. S. Levinson, Skepticism, Democracy, and Judicial
Restraint: An Essay on the Thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter,
ch. 1 (Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University 1969). Thus, Holmes's thought combines
both older and more foreword-looking elements, which is part of its endless
fascination for historians and other scholars. In beginning our discussion of legal
modernism with Holmes, we use Holmes as many others have-as less a progenitor
than as a symbol of trends that have become central to American legal thought.
201 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 199, at 186.
202 Id. at 186-87.
203 Id. at 187.
20 See S. NovIcK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIrE O OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
43-52, 65-68, 71-73 (1989) (discussing profound impact of war on Holmes and
describing the three times he was wounded in battle-at Ball's Bluff, Antietam, and
Fredricksburg).
1647
1648 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.139:1597
and make him a useful animal."20 5 This stunning imagery pre-
cedes the well-known Holmesian injunction that "[ilt is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV."2° 6 And for Holmes "[i]t is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past."20 7  The liberating cure is to reject "antiquarianism" and
instead to become the student of economics and statistics. Thus,
in a famous phrase, Holmes asks us to wash our traditional beliefs
about law and legal traditions in "cynical acid."
20 8
The modernism of Holmes is not the modernist anxiety of
Schoenberg, who feels the past slipping away and must strive to
regain it and follow its commands. It is rather the modernism of
Stravinsky, for whom the past is an alien thing, to be used instru-
mentally in future compositions. The very comparison of history to
a monster suggests that the past has already become strange to us,
that we have already begun the process of detachment and separa-
tion. Another great modernist, James Joyce, speaking through the
character of Stephen Daedelus, wrote of history as a nightmare from
which he was trying to awake.2° 9 Whether Holmes would have
gone quite that far, there can be no doubt that he had only disdain
for those who put their faith in history and its "teachings" without
reflection about the value and cogency of those purported lessons.
The purpose of studying history is not to revere it, but to analyze
it-to show it "in the daylight" and "count [its] teeth and claws."
2 10
And this analysis can only proceed, as Morgan points out, "when the
current moment ... loses its ability to cast its own peculiar
colouration on the past [so that one] is able to look upon the past
with such detachment and objectivity." 21 1 In The Path of the Law,
the legacy of the past is now described as "dogma," itself a word
richly redolent of Protestant reformers' critique of the encrusted
traditions of the Church they sought to overthrow.
2 12
205 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 199, at 187.206 Id.
207 Id.
28 Id. at 174.
209 See J. JOYCE, THE PORTABLE JAMES JOYCE 674 (H. Levin ed. 1966) (excerpts
from Ulysses).
210 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 199, at 187.
211 Morgan, supra note 95, at 67.
212 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 199, at 169.
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The theme of detachment from the legal tradition is also clear
in Holmes's call for a social scientific approach. If the legal
tradition is a dragon, we are no longer its subjects. Rather, we are
to become zoologists, whose purpose is to study and even dissect
the creature. The "man of the future" is a social scientist because
the goal of legal study has moved from exposition and interpreta-
tion of legal texts and doctrines to the study of law as a social
phenomenon. "It is perfectly proper," as Holmes pointed out in his
essay Law in Science and Science in Law, "to regard and study the law
simply as a great anthropological document."213 An anthropolo-
gist, unlike the native, observes the culture from a psychic distance
rather than participating in its beliefs and performing its rituals
unself-consciously.
Finally, Holmes's*iconoclasm is consistent with another way of
looking at the experience of modernism-as a perceived conflict
between reason and tradition, a tension which manifests itself, for
example, in the conflict between the search for truth through
rational inquiry and the need for faith in the teachings of revealed
religion.214 Holmes makes quite clear that he reconciles this
conflict in favor of what he perceives to be reason-in this case the
instrumental reason of fitting means to ends-and against received
dogmatic tradition. The future of the law is as the servant of
reason, which for Holmes is nothing more than rational calculations
designed to achieve most effectively what the community wants.
215
The inefficacious dogmas of the past, on the other hand, are to be
eliminated as much as possible.
To be sure, the modernity we find in Holmes is not yet full-
fledged. There is an undercurrent of optimism in these remarks
that bears neither traces of anxiety about what is slipping away nor
doubts about the efficacy of the scientific approach. One could well
write an article on "Holmes's last paragraphs," the conclusions to
his otherwise pessimistic and sometimes even savage remarks that
suddenly transform the occasion into one of hope and (relative)
optimism about one's place in the world. Thus The Path of the Law
concludes by Holmes telling his audience that through the analysis
213 O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS,
supra note 199, at 210, 212.
214 We emphasize here that this characteristic feature of modernity by no means
originates with Holmes, or even with modernity itself. See supra notes 136-41 and
accompanying text.
215 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 213, at 225.
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of the "remoter and more general aspects of the law you not only
become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with
the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its
unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law."216 Whether
a remnant of his grandfather's Calvinist sensibility or a continuing
reflection of the influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson's transcenden-
talist faith in the ultimate resolution of all apparent tensions and
contradictions, 217 there is little of the more contemporary sense
of intellectual anxiety about the lack of even a "hint" of some
unified perspective of the world. Nor is there any sense of irony
about the situation that Holmes finds himself in; it does not occur
to him that historicizing the work of previous judges calls into
question whether his own work is simply another form of "dogma,"
to be treated as such by a later generation capable of placing him in
a discrete historical setting and recognizing his own blindness and
lack of insight.
218
Nevertheless, the seeds of legal modernity are clear enough in
The Path of the Law. It was therefore entirely fitting that Jerome
Frank would see Holmes as a model in his appropriately titled book
Law and the Modem Mind.219  Frank's veneration of Holmes is
characteristic of the further development of legal modernity we find
in the work of the Realists. The Realists are commonly thought to
have launched an attack on the autonomy of law and legal reason-
ing. But the autonomy of law is of at least two types. The first is
the autonomy of law from politics or social beliefs. The second, and
equally important sense of autonomy is the autonomy of law from
other disciplines, which generates a faith that discrete "legal"
methods of analysis will be sufficient to solve legal problems.
220
Because legal decisions might be better explained by the study of
social forces than by the results of doctrinal argument, and because
legal issues need the expertise of the economist or sociologist, "the
Id. at 202. And those familiar with Holmes's famous dissent in Lochnerv. New
York are likely to overlook his argument that the test of legislative reasonableness is
whether a statute would "infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law." Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
217 For an extended comparison of Holmes and Emerson, see S. Levinson, supra
note 200.
218 Still less is Holmes's attitude post-modern in his desire to fashion a grand, all-
encompassing theory of law.
2 19 j. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
2, See Balkin, supra note 64, at 795; Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 762-66 (1987).
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man of the future," as Holmes puts it, must be acquainted with
social science.
221
With the rise of legal realism, new forms of legal scholarship
emerge. Previously, the goal of much legal scholarship had been to
explicate or interpret existing law, to offer the best interpretation
of legal materials through traditional forms of doctrinal argument.
The rise of realism brings with it an additional goal-to suggest
policy based reasons for development of legal doctrine in one
direction rather than another, even if these policy based reasons are
not suggested or implicated by the language of existing legal
materials. The realist approach begins to separate the goals of
scholarship from those of the bar, although eventually the practicing
bar would assimilate the approach of "going beyond the cases," at
least in part.
222
A second and more significant development is the attempt to
study law as a social artifact, as Holmes's "great anthropological
document." The result is a scholarship where one studies the
behavior of lawyers and judges, not to further or contribute to their
interpretive enterprise, but rather to study the enterprise itself. The
most extreme example of this approach is Herman Oliphant's
suggestion that-scholars might dispense with the study of doctrine
altogether and investigate instead the effects that certain "stimuli"
(i.e., facts) had on the "responses" (i.e., opinions) produced- by
judges.223 Oliphant's behaviorist approach to legal scholarship,
while not universally adopted by the realists, is nevertheless
characteristic of a new sense of detachment from the practice of
law. The legal scholar has, to a large degree, left the tribe and
become an anthropologist. We normally think of realism as the
study of "law in action" and thus a movement closer towards what
the law "really is." Yet this very goal ironically produces a separa-
tion or estrangement between the student and the thing being
studied. "Objectivity" requires that the member of the tribe no
longer take at face value the natives' explanations for what they are
doing. Dispassion requires distance. One cannot pour cynical acid
on one's own skin.
224
221 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 199, at 187.
See Rubin, ThePractice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1835
(1988).
223 Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. L.J. 73 (1928).
24 As Professor Schlegel reminds us, the realist study of law as a social artifact
had at least two versions. One might engage in social scientific research with an eye
to eventual suggestions for reform, a position that Schlegel associates with William
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Modernity has had a. lasting legacy on the forms of legal
scholarship in at least three respects. The first is the self-conscious-
ly interdisciplinary character of legal scholarship. This essay is no
exception. A second is the increasing amount of scholarship,
especially in the elite journals, that is about other legal scholarship,
rather than about primary legal materials like statutes and cases.
Legal scholarship becomes an increasingly self-contained, self-
referential discipline, which is "about itself" as much as it is about
the legal world outside, either law on the books or law in action. As
interdisciplinary movements like law and economics or law and
literature spring up, they begin to focus not on their relationship to
the work of lawyers and judges, but to their own internal coherence
and justification. Legal interpretation is replaced by legal theory,
which is replaced by meta-theory, which is replaced by meta-meta
theory, and so on.
The third feature is the fragmentation of legal scholarship into
new genres such as feminist scholarship, critical legal scholarship,
or law and economics. As a result of this fragmentation, it is
increasingly difficult for lawyers and legal academics to agree on
what good legal scholarship is and how to evaluate it. To some
extent, this was always true, as soon as legal scholarship specialized
into different subject matters like pleading, property, trusts, and so
on. Yet there was a feeling that good legal reasoning transcended
doctrinal boundaries, and that the reasonably intelligent contracts
professor could recognize it in the work of a colleague who wrote
about equity or the law of agency and partnership. The creation of
"genres" of scholarship, like law and economics or feminist
jurisprudence, which cut across traditional legal departments and
categories, undermines such confidence today. Both fields are
highly specialized with separate canons; they have very different
intellectual approaches and scholarly goals which may, in some
instances, be mutually critical of each other. Giving a piece written
in one genre to a person who specializes in another may produce
consternation, and perhaps even outright rejection.
0. Douglas and Charles Clark. Or one might engage in the scientific study of legal
institutions for its own sake, a position Schlegel finds most dearly in the work of
Underhill Moore. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science:
From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459, 517-19, 539-45, 567-69, 578-85
(1979); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case
of Underhill Moore 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195, 293-95 (1980).
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The idea of a common language and a -common vocabulary
among legal academics, and indeed, a common canon of legal
materials, has increasingly become a fiction. There is now an
identifiable group of scholars who have read AJuty of Her Peers
225
or The Critical Legal Studies Movement 226 and consider them
canonical texts. Other scholars may not have heard of either of
these works, much less consulted them. Still others, having heard
of them, may view them as, at the least, "outside" the law or,
indeed, dangerous to the enterprise of law. Robert Morgan's fear
that today "we no longer have a [musical] culture of our own," and
that such culture as we do have has become "a patchwork of
disconnected fragments snatched from here, there, and every-
where," 227 is easily translatable to legal culture. Faced with this
Heraclitian whirl of flux and discontinuity in the legal academy,
some may be tempted to form authentic performance-of-legal-
scholarship movements with a concomitant attempt to delegitimize
those they now perceive as contributing to the flux.
As these comments suggest, there is much work to be done in
exploring what modernity means for American legal culture. But it
also seems clear that the study of the effects of modernity on legal
culture requires us to have a point of comparison in other aspects
of culture with which our self-identity is not so bound up. The
anthropological study of law, in Holmes's time as in our own,
requires a form of distancing. One reason to study the effects of
modernity in music is precisely because of its distance from law and
from our own everyday experiences as lawyers and legal scholars.
It is that very distance which allows us to see comparisons within
our own discipline that might otherwise go unnoticed or underem-
phasized. For the student of legal modernity, then, a trip beyond
our own cultural moorings may well be not only a helpful but even
a necessary tool of research.
Glaspell, AJuty of Her Peers, in THE BhsT SHORT STORIES OF 1917, 256-82 (E.
O'Brien ed. 1918).2 " Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movemen4 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983).
227 Morgan, supra note 95, at 67.
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V. CONCLUSION: LAW, MUSIC, AND OTHER PERFORMING ARTS
Felix Frankfurter described as "the single most important
utterance in the literature of' constitutional law"228 John Mar-
shall's admonition that "it: is a constitution we are expounding."
2 29
Equally important is Marshall's insistence that the Constitution be
interpreted so as to "endure for ages to come, and consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 230  It has
always been feared, though, that too much "adaptation" would mean
not the endurance, but rather the death of the Constitution. Yet
how is one to tell the difference? Only half in jest do we announce
that the subtext of this review is the question whether the perfor-
mance of constitutional interpretation is better analogized to the
Hanover Band's version of the Pastoral Symphony or to a jazz
improvisation on Thelonious Monk's Round Midnight.231 We do
not mean to suggest that the choice must be exclusively between
these two alternatives. Many other musical analogies might be
suggested as well. We do mean to suggest that asking such
questions-and wrestling over the answers-helps to illuminate the
enterprise of constitutional analysis, including the particular
problems posed by this enterprise for those who must confront the
profound impact modernity has had on our political and legal culture.
3 2
228 F. FRANKFURTER,Jhn Marhall and theJudicial Function, in FELix FRANKFURTER
ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTrrU-
TION 534 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).230 Id. at 415. Not the least of Marshall's rhetorically brilliant gestures is italicizing
"crises" instead of "adapt" and "Constitution" instead of"we." See Schlag, TheProblem
of the Subject 69 TEx. L. REv. (forthcoming 1991).
231 For a recent musing on the similarities between the Constitution andjazz, see
Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theoy and Practice in a World Where Courts are
No Different From Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 837 n.10 (1991) ("On the
Constitution as a Lead Sheet.") (italics omitted).
232 Cf. D. KORNSTEIN, supra note 48, at 110 ("For all we know, one night this week
Zubin Mehta... will stand at his podium and whisper to the New York Philharmon-
ic: 'We must never forget that it is a symphony we are expounding.'").
Professor Ely suggests that "those who assert the possibility of differentiating
valid from invalid constitutional interpretation on the basis of 'craft limits' of a sort
they assert are recognized in the arts are likely to be badly disappointed when they
get around to a close examination of the analogues." Ely, supra note 231, at 837 n.10.
The reason is, apparently, that "every time there develops what appears to be a
consensus among musicians (and their listeners), to the effect that a certain interval
is unacceptable noise, someone who can't be dismissed on any principled basis as 'not
a real musician' starts using it, and others often follow." Id. Of course, this does not
demonstrate that the analogy is useless, only that it cannot serve to legitimate
particular limits on the practice of constitutional interpretation by appeal to existing
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It is often our proudest boast that we in the United States live
within the embrace of a constitutional tradition whose origins we
can locate and whose continuity we can celebrate even two centuries
later. Yet, as we have seen, explaining what it means to adhere to
a tradition, particularly in an age of modernist self-consciousness,
is itself an extraordinarily difficult assignment. Although tradition
seems to imply stasis as much as modernity implies change, in fact,
as Roxana Waterston points out, "'tradition' really describes a
process of handing down, and as such is just as dynamic and as
historical as any other social process."213 Yet the abstract ideals
of fixed tradition and mutable modernity are simultaneously
motivating factors in this dynamic of change. Thus "[t]radition, like
history, is something that is continually being recreated and
remodelled in the present, even as it is represented as fixed and
unchangeable."
23 4
"craft values." And that fact is itself quite interesting.
However, because Ely sees that the analogy to jazz is not much use in legitimat-
ing the sort of limits on constitutional interpretation he would like to exist, he
conludes that it is not dear what we can learn from the analogy ofjazz to constitu-
tional law. See id. But for someone who is less interested than Ely in legitimating
judicial review by distinguishing it from legislation, and is more interested in asking
questions about how legitimation actually occurs, one learns a great deal from the
analogy about how seemingly "objective" standards or craft values are constantly
altering themselves. Thus, Ely sees his analogy as "not much use" precisely because
it does not serve his particular project-because he does not want to conclude that the
craft ofjudidal interpretation, like that of musical interpretation, is always altering
itself historically. On the other hand, a person with a quite different project
(understanding the phenomenon of constitutional interpretation and how elitesjustify
it to themselves and to others) might find the analogy useful for precisely the reasons
that Ely rejects it.
We think this example demonstrates something quite important about the
pragmatic enterprise we are engaged in. First, for different projects (legitimation vs.
anthropology) different tools may be more or less useful to the task, and thus
different analogies will be more or less useful. Second, it does not follow from Ely's
discussion that analogies between law and the arts are not possible, or that they will
not stimulate thought, but rather that one's ability to use analogies to convince others
with very different agendas will be limited because they will tend to reject analogies
which move in directions they do not like, and the more unusual the analogy appears,
the easier it will be for them to reject it out of hand. This should come as no surprise
to anyone who has ever had a discussion with someone with a very different agenda.
Thus while asserting that analogies can be helpful, the pragmatist always understands
that analogies become more or less useful tools of discussion and persuasion
depending upon the audience they are directed to.
233 R. WATERSON, THE LIVING HOUSE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF ARCHrrECTURE IN
SouTH-EAST AsIA 232 (1990).
234 Id. See also Balkin, Tradition, Betraya, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1619 (1990) (discussing conceptual affinities between tradition and
betrayal in constitutional law).
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Perhaps the best illustration of the belief that we are participat-
ing in a living tradition is found in Justice John Marshall Harlan's
well-known analysis of the meaning of "substantive due process" in
Poe v. Ullman.235 Harlan looked to the "balance [between the
liberty of the individual and the demands of organized society]
struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing."23 6 Interestingly,
Harlan's description of a "living" tradition explicitly involved both
continuity with and alterations of previous tradition.23 7 It is
perhaps no coincidence that Robert Bork, the self-styled apostle of
"original intent," describes Harlan's arguments as "entirely
legislative" and denounces the opinion as simply a way station
toward the "intellectual catastrophe" of Griswold v. Connecticut.238
We believe that in Poe, as elsewhere, Harlan showed himself to
be a quintessential performer of constitutional law. Another major
theme of this review is the importance of grasping the performative
aspect of engagement with the law. This is obvious in the case of a
judge, but it is present as well in the acts of a vigorous public critic
of judges, such as Robert Bork.2 39 Insofar as law is a perform-
ative art, insight can be gained from looking at performance
practices (and theory) in other arts.
Thus, we believe that legal scholars have something to learn
fromJonathan Miller's views on the challenges facing anyone called
upon to direct a play, and in particular his attack on the notion "of
the primary status of the text ... as a literary work."240 Those
who hold such a view, he suggests, believe
that in some peculiar way the play is at its very best when read
quietly by the informed reader, who somehow manages to
dramatize in his or her imagination a performance that is more
congruent with the intentions of the author than any particular
performance could ever be, and all performances then represent
a lapse from this ideal state.
2 41
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239 See S. LEVINSON, supra note 22, at 18-53; Balkin, supra note 107, at 937 n.116
(discussing role of non-judicial interpretations of the Constitution).240J. MILLER, supra note 104, at 22.
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1991] LAW, MUSIC, AND OTHER PERFORMING ARTS
Though there may be an important sense in which "great plays can
be said to exist without being theatrically performed," 2 2 one
would wonder "why a writer had chosen to cast his ideas in the form
of a play at all"243 inasmuch as the conventional meaning assigned
the genre "play" includes performance. 2"4 "I cannot deny the fact
that each time a play is staged the production is inevitably a limited
version of the range of possible interpretations," but, nonetheless,
"the destiny of a great play is to undergo a series of performances
each of which is incomplete, and in some cases may prove mislead-
ing and perverse." Still, "[b]y submitting itself to the possibility of
successive re-creation,.., the play passes through the development
that is its birthright."2 5 Miller's analysis applies to music as well.
Although it is surely possible to read a music score and to construct
an "ideal" performance in one's mind, this is surely not the
conventional practice of experiencing music. Enacted performance,
for most of us, is inextricably linked with notes on a page.
Is this not also true of law, especially as conceptualized by those
realists, influenced by Holmes, who emphasized "law in action"?
Did they not ask us to focus on the performances of actual people-
ordinary citizens, lawyers, police, public officials, and judges-rather
than to concentrate on mere "law on the books," i.e., the text
independent of its performance? To be sure, one can read the texts
of the law as collected in statute books and the like, but in that
guise they are only in a state of limbo. They await their perfor-
mance by legal actors and actresses or, to shift the metaphor, by
virtuosos of the law who can interpret melodic lines in the law in
ways overlooked by previous players.
242 Id. at 23.
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244 Indeed, Miller points out, "[t]here is a tendency to forget that for a playwright
like Shakespeare the written script was not intended for publication but as an aid to
performance without any view to a distant posterity." Id. Miller would also
presumably endorse recent suggestions by Shakespeare scholars that what we refer
to today as the "texts" of the plays, deviation from which presumably is questionable,
are themselves creations of a decidedly post-Shakespearean moment that overlooks
the fact that his own actors felt altogether comfortable engaging in their own
"contributions" to the manuscripts handed them. Thus Stephen Orgel notes that
Shakespeare wrote his plays for performance rather than as publications to be read
outside the theater. "Shakespeare habitually began with more than he needed," so
that "his scripts offered the company a range of possibilities, and ... the process of
production was a collaborative one of selection as well as of realization and
interpretation." See Brett, supra note 114, at 106 (quoting Orgel, The Authentic
Shakespeare 21 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 7 (Winter 1988)).
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It should now be clear why a review that began by considering
how to perform Beethoven's first piano concerto should have gone
on to address how those designated to engage in legal performance,
like judges, interpret statutes or the Constitution. We believe that
there is indeed a relation between law and music, derived in part
from their common textuality and necessity for subsequent
performance. And it should also by now be clear why studying this
relationship of common textuality draws us more and more into the
study of culture as a whole. For performance, whether legal or
musical, is always situated in a culture and reflects the distinctive
problematics of that culture. Thus, if ours is a modern culture, our
interpretations, our subsequent performances of law and of music,
must be understood in the light of the tangled and complicated
experience of modernity and its gradual transformation into what
is now called the postmodern. Although we have only begun to
explore the complexities of the subject in this essay, we firmly
believe that any deep understanding of legal thought in the
twentieth century requires legal scholars to confront the meaning
of modernity for law and legal culture. To the extent that the study
of other aspects of culture, including music, must also confront
questions of interpretation and subsequent performance under the
shadow of modernity, we believe that comparative study can aid us
in our more parochial task of understanding the law itself. We
think we understand our own "England" better by having visited
other shores, and we are confident that others can benefit from the
same experience.
We are not suggesting that one best understands England by
emigrating from it and establishing one's permanent life elsewhere;
similarly, we doubt that one can best understand law by spending all
of one's time on what follows the "and" in various "law and . . ."
movements. But there are few people left who do not believe that
at least some of one's time should be spent looking on what follows
the "and," and the question is whether musical performance should
become a suitable candidate for such study. We think that it
should. We should have no trouble recognizing Richard Taruskin,
Charles Rosen, Neal Zaslaw, and Christopher Hogwood as our own
colleagues engaged in a common enterprise of trying to figure out
how one meaningfully inhabits a practice of performance after
innocence has been lost. They are all writing interesting, provoca-
tive, infuriating, and, most importantly, illuminating work that
should interest any of us -who daily wrestle with our own perfor-
mance practices as lawyers, judges, or teachers of the law.
